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Abstract
This doctoral dissertation comprises three essays which study the determinants
of bond yields.
The dissertation is organised around the idea that bond yields can be
partitioned into a risky component which prices for the risk of illiquidity and
default; and a risk-free component which prices for investors’ time preferences,
and expected monetary policy movements (Homer and Leibowitz, 2004). The
first essay considers the liquidity and credit premia in supranational, semi-
government and agency bond yields; term premia in sovereign bond yields
and their relation to the economy constitute the focus of the second essay;
and the third essay is devoted to an inquiry into the nature of expectations of
future monetary policy movements in bond yields.
The first essay presents a new method for consistent cross-sectional pricing
of all traded bonds in the fixed income market. By applying thin plate
regression splines (Wood, 2003) to bootstrapped zero coupon bond yields
(Hagan and West, 2006), the method decomposes traded yields into a risk free
component plus premia for credit and liquidity risks, where the decomposition
is consistent with the market valuations and underlying cash flows of the
bonds. We apply the framework to end of quarter yield data from 2008
to 2011 on Australian dollar denominated semi-government, supranational
and agency bonds, and find that the surface provides an excellent fit to the
underlying zero coupon yield curves. Further, the decomposition of selected
yield time series and cross sections demonstrate how credit premia increased
for Australian semi-government, supranational and agency bonds through the
Global Financial Crisis, but were counterbalanced by liquidity discounts as
investors sought safe haven securities.
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The second essay designs conditional tests for the liquidity preference
hypothesis, which predicts monotonicity in term premia. Drawing on the
excess return forecasting literature (Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005; Ludvigson
and Ng, 2009), the tests are conditioned on information from macroeconomic
variables and the current yield curve. Specifically, a filter is constructed to use
this conditioning information set in new versions of the Wolak test (Boudoukh
et al., 1999a) and Monotonicity Relation test (Patton and Timmermann, 2010)
for the liquidity preference hypothesis. Consistent with the literature, our tests
conclude that raw, unconditional term premia in U.S. Treasury bills between
1965 and 2001 do not increase monotonically. However, we find that the tests
indicate term premia in Treasury bills do increase monotonically when the
sample term premia are conditioned on the excess return forecasting factors.
This confirms the explanatory power of the excess return forecasting factors,
and also suggests that conditioning information should be used in applying
inequality constraints tests to determine whether the liquidity preference
hypothesis holds empirically.
The third essay evaluates the accuracy of the fixed income market in pricing
for future movements in monetary policy. By generalising the approach in
Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007) and Goodhart and Lim (2011), we compare yields
and forward rates implied by market pricing on various fixed income securities
to averages of the cash rate over corresponding periods with an ordinary
least squares regression model. Where the market pricing is subject to risk
premia, instrumental variables are used to strip away the effects of the risk
premia as if they were measurement errors. When we apply our framework to
Australian fixed income pricing from 2004 to 2010, we find that, consistent with
findings in the extant literature, the market is quite effective in forecasting cash
rate movements over horizons of up to six months. Beyond that horizon, the
presence of risk premia diminishes to a large extent the signal on expectations in
market pricing, but our instrumental variables framework suggests nonetheless
that there is important information in fixed income market pricing regarding
expected cash rate movements over the one to three year horizon.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The bond market lies at the intersection between the real economy and finan-
cial markets. With regard to the economy, the risk-free Treasury yield curve
responds to shocks in inflation and growth expectations. The benchmark
provided by the yield curve underpins all other interest rates in the economy,
and thus determines the supply and price of credit. There is a strong relation-
ship between the business cycle and the yield curve. The supply of bonds is
determined by fiscal policy, and monetary policy influences the short end of
the yield curve. Offshore flows of funds to and from the domestic bond market
constitute an important determinant of the capital account in the balance of
payments.
Turning to financial markets, the risk-free yield curve sets the discount
factors according to which all other financial assets are priced. The yield curve
thus determines the time value of money. In a very broad sense the cashflows
of almost any financial security (and by extension, any government, corporate
or trust structure) can be treated as a bond or bond option. Furthermore,
derivatives and securitisation technologies provide almost unlimited flexibility
to market participants in structuring fixed income securities to meet their
investment, financing and hedging requirements. It is therefore clear that
the bond market plays a fundamental role in the valuation of all financial
securities in other financial markets.
At the heart of the bond market is the pricing mechanism where investors
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ascribe a value to the deterministic or risky sets of cashflows that are attached
to fixed income securities. This dissertation explores empirical aspects of bond
market pricing. The underlying philosophy of our research is that raw market
pricing is informative: important information about investors’ risk sentiment
and interest rate, inflation and growth expectations can therefore be extracted
from observed market pricing with minimal interference from models.
Specifically, in this dissertation, we consider how the bond market prices
for risk. The aim is to measure and characterise the credit and liquidity premia
in Australian dollar denominated semi-government, supranational and agency
bonds (Chapter 2); the term premia in U.S. Treasury bills (Chapter 3); and
the expectations of future monetary policy movements in various Australian
fixed income instruments and interest rate futures (Chapter 4). In each case,
we find that valuable information can indeed be extracted from the market
pricing implied by bond yields. The remainder of the present Chapter provides
an overview of the research problem, methodology, findings and significance
of each Chapter in the dissertation.
Chapter 2, ‘Bond pricing with a surface of zero coupon yields’, explores
whether the fixed income market prices in a consistent manner Treasury bonds
along with other bonds of different credit qualities and with different liquidity
characteristics. A model is proposed for risk free zero coupon yields, credit
premia and liquidity premia for all tenors across all securities in the entire
fixed income market at a single point in time.
Our model builds on ideas from the fixed income literature, especially with
respect to estimating zero coupon yields. Of course, most of this literature
simply addresses the bootstrapping of Treasury zero coupon yields, so our
model represents an important extension of the conventional methods. A
surface of zero coupon yields capable of pricing the entire fixed income market
would be useful in assessing relative value, and thus could assist investment
and issuance decisions. While there are separate streams of the literature
on credit premia (eg. Krishnan et al., 2010) and liquidity premia (eg. Bao
et al., 2011) in bond yields, there is a paucity of scholarship on simultaneous
estimation of risk free rates, credit spreads and liquidity spreads (Houweling
et al., 2001; Jarrow et al., 2004; Cruz-Marcelo et al., 2011); and on applications
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of multivariate smoothing splines to yield curve estimation (Krivobokova et al.,
2006).
To implement the model, we use end-of-day market yields for bonds issued
by a wide range of issuers as the key input for the model. Zero coupon yield
curves are then estimated for each issuer’s bonds with a standard bootstrap
and smoothing splines interpolation (starting with the risk-free Treasury zero
curve) (Hagan and West, 2006). Next, we compute risk free asset swap margins
for each bond. These are margins to the floating rate on an interest rate swap
based on the Treasury zero curve that match exactly the cash flows of the
bond (Manning, 2004). We fit an approximation to a multivariate smoothing
spline (a thin plate regression spline) through the cloud of points to get a
zero coupon surface (Wood, 2003). Given the surface and the underlying zero
coupon bond yields, we can then assess how well the surface prices bonds and
swaps. For each issuer, we also solve for the constant risk free asset swap
margin that best prices its bonds off the zero coupon surface. This margin
is the fundamental measure of the credit premia, and the zero coupon yield
errors to the surface are the fundamental measures of liquidity premia.
We find that the zero coupon yield surface summarises effectively the
information in traded yields from the semi-government, supranational and
agency segment of the Australian fixed income market. Looking at the
quarter-end fit of the surface from 2008Q1 to 2011Q1, it is clear that the
disruption in pricing through the Global Financial Crisis affects the surface;
but that the surface still captures much of the cross-sectional variation in bond
yields for different issuers. Furthermore, the surface can be used to provide
decompositions of traded bond yields into a risk-free component plus premia
for credit and liquidity. We explore the decomposition in a cross-sectional
(yield curve) sense and in a time series sense for selected bond lines of a
prominent issuer. The decomposition shows how credit yield premia widened
during the Crisis, but there were liquidity yield discounts for high quality
semi-government, supranational and agency bonds.
Taking a step back, the zero coupon yield surface model has potential to
change fundamentally our understanding of the fixed income market from a
correlated set of two dimensional yield curves and spreads to an evolving three
3
dimensional surface that can be decomposed into term premia (the pure time
value of money component), credit premia (associated with default risk) and
idiosyncratic liquidity premia.
Chapter 3, ‘Conditional tests of monotonicity in term premia’, considers
the expected shape of term premia in U.S. Treasury bills across tenors, drawing
on the econometric methodology of multiple inequality constraints testing.
Existing specifications of inequality constraints tests for monotonicity in term
premia (Boudoukh et al., 1999a; Patton and Timmermann, 2010) suffer from
low power because they utilise an insufficient set of conditioning information.
Hence, we improve the tests by incorporating excess return forecasting factors
from the forward curve (Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005); and factors estimated
via principal components analysis from a large panel of macro variables as
conditioning information (Ludvigson and Ng, 2009).
An inequality constraints test for term premia conditioned on macro and
forward curve factors is the logical next step in relation to at least three strands
of the literature. First, the literature on excess return forecasting factors does
not consider the conditional shape of premia across tenors (Ludvigson and
Ng, 2009; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005; Duffee, 2011). Second, scholarship
on inequality constraints testing does not accommodate the use of principal
components as conditioning information (Boudoukh et al., 1999a; Patton and
Timmermann, 2010). Third, the literature on arbitrage free term structure
modelling does not address traditional theories about the term structure,
instead adopting parametric forms for risk premia that do not necessarily
reflect empirical term structure dynamics (eg. Joslin et al., 2010, 2011).
To conduct the conditional monotonicity tests, we start with a monthly
dataset of zero coupon U.S. Treasury bill yields as inputs. We compute
excess returns over a one year horizon with various long and short tenors.
We collect the excess return forecasting factors (Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005;
Ludvigson and Ng, 2009) from the respective authors’ websites and align
these datasets with our excess returns data. Then, we filter the factors to
be non-negative, multiply them by our data and perform the Monotonicity
Relations test (Patton and Timmermann, 2010) and Wolak test (Boudoukh
et al., 1999a) on the conditional sample data. Finally, we compare the p-values
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of the conditional tests with those of the unconditional tests, and perform
a simulation study to assess the empirical power of the two tests, with and
without the use of the conditioning information.
Our tests suggest that the use of conditioning information changes the
outcome of the tests from the unconditional case. Both the Monotonicity
Relations Test and the Wolak Test suggest that U.S. Treasury bill term
premia are non-monotonic using the unconditional sample. However, when
we condition our tests on the positive elements of the Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005) and Ludvigson and Ng (2009) factors in particular, the tests suggest that
the conditional term premia are monotonically increasing. This is evidence
that the excess return forecasting factors do have explanatory power in respect
of the conditional shape of term premia. Further, our results imply that the
conditional tests shed new light on how the monotonicity tests can be applied
to term premium data, by better capturing the information that market
participants are ostensibly considering when they determine U.S. Treasury bill
pricing. The simulation experiments then show that the conditional tests are
more powerful in detecting monotonicity than their unconditional equivalents.
More generally, our approach to testing for the conditional shape of term
premia across tenors provides an effective method for empirically characterising
term premia, and thereby describing the evolution of the yield curve over time
in terms of departures from the expectations hypothesis. Our approach does
not impose the a´-priori structure of an arbitrage free term structure model,
and yet it allows for statistically powerful tests of hypotheses about the ex
ante shape of term premia across tenors.
Chapter 4, ‘Measuring monetary policy expectations’, assesses the accuracy
of the Australian fixed income market in pricing for future movements in
the monetary policy instrument. We develop an econometric framework for
measuring monetary policy expectations from fixed income pricing that is well
founded in asset pricing theory. The framework allows us to abstract away
from risk premia in market pricing, and also facilitates the measurement of
hitherto elusive long term interest rate expectations of horizons between one
and three years.
There is a paucity of scholarly literature on measuring monetary policy
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expectations from fixed income securities without using the prism of a term
structure model. The literature on extracting policy expectations from asset
prices is mainly limited to money markets and related futures contracts (eg.
Kuttner, 2001; Taylor, 2010). While money markets and short term interest
rate futures have a direct relation to the policy instrument, they often suffer
from a lack of liquidity and are therefore subject to additional risk premia
(Piazzesi and Swanson, 2008).
Our econometric framework provides a mechanism for comparing yields
and implied forward rates associated with market pricing for various types
of Australian fixed income securities with the ex-post average cash rate over
the same period. The universe of fixed income securities under consideration
in our study includes: overnight indexed swaps, interbank futures, bank bills,
bank bill futures, and Treasury bond futures. Once we have calculated the
yields from market prices on the one hand, and corresponding average cash
rates on the other, we compute cash rate forecast errors for each type of fixed
income security at each observation date. This leads to root mean squared
forecast errors for each type of fixed income security. Also, in a simple attempt
to abstract away from risk premia down to a linear approximation, we regress
the cash rate returns onto the yields and forwards. Then, to provide further
robustness around our results, and better control for the effects of risk premia,
we use a generalised method of moments instrumental variables estimation
framework. Under this framework, the yields and forwards of securities that are
subject to term, credit and liquidity risks are instrumented with other yields
and forwards that are not subject to those risks. In this manner, we improve
on the simple regression framework that has been adopted by most other
studies of market-based measures of monetary policy expectations (Gu¨rkaynak
et al., 2007; Goodhart and Lim, 2011).
The principal findings of our study are as follows: Overnight indexed swaps
perform best at forecasting the Australian cash rate over the nearest two
quarters. Beyond that, accuracy drops off substantially over longer horizons.
The OLS regressions show that some of the influence of risk premia can be
incorporated into the intercept term for each security, thus improving the
forecast efficacy of all of the Australian fixed income securities. However,
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these regressions still leave much of the variation in the cash rate unexplained.
This is because, beyond the horizon of six months, the presence of risk premia
diminishes to a large extent the signal on expectations in market pricing.
Nonetheless, our instrumental variables framework suggests there is valuable
information embedded in pricing on three and ten year bond futures contracts
regarding expected cash rate movements over the one to three year horizon.
Our framework is preferable to other methods such as dynamic term struc-
ture models, because the components of the framework are all observable.
Furthermore, by constructing a composite measure that incorporates informa-
tion from liquid long term securities and those with payoffs dependent directly
on future policy movements with an instrumental variables framework, our
framework extends the extant literature on assessing policy expectations in
fixed income securities.
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Chapter 2
Bond pricing with a surface of
zero coupon yields
2.1 Introduction
Each trade in the fixed income market represents an individual market par-
ticipant’s view on the time value of money, and the amount of compensation
required by investors for taking on credit and liquidity risk. Nonetheless, bond
market pricing is not determined in isolation from one trade to the next. To
the extent that it is an efficient market, the fixed income market does not
just price consistently between the different securities of the same issuer — it
prices consistently between the securities of different issuers. At a single point
in time, the market’s pricing for sovereign, semi-sovereign, bank and corporate
bonds is jointly determined. The principal argument of this essay is that the
fixed income market differentiates between security specific characteristics in a
consistent manner, and applies the same approach to pricing for risk between
different fixed income securities.
Hence, it should be possible to model a set of zero coupon yields that
reflects consistently the information in all of the separately determined zero
coupon yield curves associated with the traded securities of each issuer, and
that can thus be used to price all bonds in the market. What does consistency
mean in the context of synthesising information from different zero coupon
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yield curves? From the econometrician’s perspective, this means that if the
zero coupon yield curves of different issuers are placed side by side (in order
of credit risk) in a three dimensional space with axes for tenor, credit risk and
zero coupon yields, it should be possible to fit a smooth surface through the
yield curves. Such a surface would then summarise all of the discount factors
that are being used to price traded bonds in the market.
Our argument constitutes a fundamental challenge to the extant literature
on fixed income market valuation. To date, authors have focused on single
aspects of the fixed income market in isolation.1 There are growing bodies of
scholarship aiming to measure and explain credit spreads (Martell, 2008; Liu
et al., 2009; Jacoby et al., 2009; Krishnan et al., 2010), and liquidity premia
(Chordia et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007; Goyenko et al., 2010; Bao et al., 2011)
in bond yields, that complement, but do not address directly the underlying
literature on zero coupon yield curve estimation from risk free Government
bond yields (Fama and Bliss, 1987; Nelson and Siegel, 1987; Fisher et al., 1994;
Anderson and Sleath, 2001; Hagan and West, 2006) and defaultable bond
yields (Houweling et al., 2001; Jarrow et al., 2004; Jarrow, 2004; Jankowitsch
and Pichler, 2004; Cruz-Marcelo et al., 2011). However, if risk free zero coupon
yields, credit premia and liquidity premia are determined jointly across the
fixed income market, then the extant literature is not taking into account
the fundamental interactions between these quantities that influence market
valuations.
Accordingly, we present a unified method that prices simultaneously all
risk free and defaultable bonds in the market, and thereby leads to consistent
measures of credit and liquidity premia. Under this method, a smooth surface
is fit through a three dimensional cloud of zero coupon yields. The co-ordinates
of these zero coupon yields within the cloud are determined by their tenor
and their risk free asset swap margin, which is the margin to the floating rate
for an interest rate swap based on the risk free zero coupon yield curve that
matches exactly the cash flows of the underlying bond. The smooth surface is
1This is no surprise, given that credit and liquidity premia cannot be directly observed
from market pricing data (Boyle et al., 2009), which makes their dynamics through time
quite difficult to characterise (Allen and Powell, 2009).
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then modelled as a thin plate regression spline, which is an approximation to
a multivariate smoothing spline. Constructed in this manner, such a “zero
coupon yield surface” constitutes a model of all zero coupon yield curves
(equivalently, discount factors) in the market. Under additional identification
assumptions, the model can then be used to decompose traded bond yields
into a risk free component plus premia for credit and liquidity. The zero
coupon yield surface is an important extension of extant methods in fixed
income analysis, where zero coupon yield curves are typically estimated only
from Government bond yields and interest rate swap yields. Our technique
generalises traditional bootstrap and interpolation methods (Hagan and West,
2006) to other fixed income securities, and facilitates the decomposition of
traded bond yields into their basic constituents.
We find that the zero coupon yield surface provides an accurate char-
acterisation of the information in traded yields from the semi-government,
supranational and agency (SSA) segment of the Australian fixed income mar-
ket. The root mean squared fitting errors of the surface over 2008Q1 to 2011Q1
hit their peak of 15 basis points at the height of the Global Financial Crisis
in 2009Q2, but quickly recede thereafter. We show that despite the market
turbulence, the surface still captures much of the cross-sectional variation in
bond yields across different issuers. Furthermore, we use the surface to decom-
pose traded bond yields into a risk-free component plus premia for credit and
liquidity. We explore the decomposition in both a cross-sectional (yield curve)
sense and in a time series sense for selected bond lines of three prominent
issuers. The decomposition shows how credit premia spiked during the Crisis,
but the impact on pricing was dampened by the presence of liquidity discounts
for high quality SSA bonds. This is consistent with investor sentiment through
the Crisis period, where SSA bonds were perceived by portfolio managers as a
safe haven asset class.
The remainder of this essay is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes
the construction of the zero coupon yield surface. In Section 2.3 the resulting
zero coupon yield surface is shown to price accurately the entire cross-section
of SSA securities in the Australian fixed income market using end of quarter
valuation yields. This Section also shows how the surface can be used to
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decompose traded bond yields under additional identification assumptions.
Finally, Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Zero coupon yield surface
2.2.1 Zero coupon yields
At the outset, we bootstrap zero coupon yields from traded bond yields for
each issuer across the market, using linear interpolation on log discount factors.
This is a standard technique in fixed income analysis, and is well documented
in eg. Hagan and West (2006) and Fama and Bliss (1987) (details are provided
in the Appendix). This gives us separate zero coupon yield curves for each
issuer in the market.
2.2.2 Risk free asset swap margins
Once zero coupon yields have been computed for each of the issuers in the
fixed income market, the next step is to calculate the measure of credit risk.
This measure is used to project the zero coupon yields into a three dimensional
space with axes for yield, tenor and credit risk. The relevant measure of credit
risk to be used is the riskfree asset swap margin, which is an asset swap margin
using a swap based on the Treasury zero coupon yield curve.2
These asset swap margins are a purely market-based measure of credit risk,
which are superior to alternatives such as credit ratings, benchmark par yield
spreads, exchange for physical spreads and zero coupon yield spreads. This is
because asset swap margins take account of the cash flows of the underlying
securities; and they can measure credit risk for any fixed income security given
its market price.
2An asset swap is a type of trade in the fixed income market where the investor purchases
a bond and an interest rate swap, such that the investor’s fixed coupon receipts on the bond
are converted into floating rate cashflow receipts (Fabozzi, 1991). Under the interest rate
swap, the investor pays fixed coupons that match the cashflows that she receives from the
bond, and receives floating rate coupons on the swap. The asset swap margin is then the
additional margin over the market floating rate that the investor receives on the interest
rate swap. See the Appendix for a formal definition of an asset swap margin.
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With their flexibility in mind, we use riskfree asset swap margins to assess
the credit risk of risky bonds relative to the risk free Government zero coupon
yield curve. The riskfree asset swap margin is calculated with the discount
factors taken from the riskfree zero coupon yield curve, and using the market
prices of defaultable bonds across the cross-section of issuers in the fixed
income market.
2.2.3 Surface interpolation method
Define rit and χit as the zero coupon yield and risk free asset swap margin
associated with issuer i at tenor t. Having obtained zero coupon yields and
risk free asset swap margins, we project triplets of zero coupon yields, risk
free asset swap margins and tenors into three dimensional space. Then we fit
the smooth surface g through these triplets. The surface takes the form of a
thin plate regression spline (Wood, 2003).3
Specifically, we estimate the bivariate thin plate regression spline
rit = g(t, χit) + it (2.1)
through the triplets of zero coupon yields, tenors and asset swap margins
{rit, t, χit}, and the resulting zero coupon yield surface summarises the entire
set of zero coupon yield curves for the fixed income market.
The errors it are crucial to the analysis of the zero surface. Clearly, small
errors indicate a close fit, and therefore constitute evidence of consistency in
fixed income market pricing from one issuer to the next.
2.2.4 Credit and liquidity yield premia
Beyond summarising the information in individual issuers’ zero coupon yield
curves, the zero coupon yield surface fulfills another important function. It
allows for traded yields to be decomposed into a risk free component along
3The construction of the splines is covered in the Appendix, here it suffices to describe
thin plate regression splines in heuristic terms as an approximation to multivariate smoothing
splines that retain the automatic knot selection property of univariate smoothing splines.
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with premia for credit risk and liquidity risk. This depends on additional
assumptions.
Now, the risk free asset swap margins as calculated for each traded bond
conflates credit and liquidity premia, and is not a pure credit spread. This is
because it captures the difference between the price and the risk free price,
which could involve either credit or liquidity premia. Given the zero coupon
yield surface, we implement the decomposition of observed bond prices with
pit = p
(γ)
it − p(χi)it − p(λit)it , (2.2)
where pit is the observed bond price, p
(γ)
it represents the net present value
of the bond’s cashflows using discount factors from the riskfree zero coupon
yield curve; p
(χi)
it is a price discount (yield premium) for credit risk, and p
(λit)
it
is a price discount (yield premium) for liquidity risk. To be explicit, this
specification is predicated on the assumption that the risk-free component of
bond yields is additive with the credit risk and liquidity risk price discounts,
and that together all three components sum to the observed bond price.4
Now, we estimate the pure credit price discount p
(χi)
it by solving the problem
p
(χi)
it ≡ p(γ)it − pit(g(t, χi)), χi : min
χ
‖ pi − pi(g(t, χ)) ‖, (2.3)
where pi is a vector containing the observed prices pit for all bonds associated
with issuer i. Also, pi(g(t, χi)) denotes the prices of the same bonds calculated
with the estimated zero coupon surface using the discount factors corresponding
to the points on the surface with tenor equal to t and constant riskfree asset
swap margins equal to χi.
5 Hence the credit price discount for a bond is its
4Our intention here is not to assert that this is the only way or the correct way to
decompose bond yields with the zero coupon surface, but to show that this is one possible
approach to decomposition using the surface. Of course, this additive decomposition would
be expected to be valid only in fixed income markets where there are few liquid bond lines
per issuer, and where extrinsic considerations such as tax, operational and sovereign risk
are not influential in pricing. This is reasonable for well developed fixed income markets
such as Australia.
5Geometrically, g(t, χi) can be represented as selecting the “slice” of the zero coupon
surface perpendicular to the riskfree asset swap margin axis that best prices a given issuers’
bonds. Note that χi is not the same as χit, as the latter incorporates both credit and
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risk free equivalent price less its pure credit price, where the latter is priced
off the zero coupon yield surface along a single risk free asset swap margin.
This is consistent with the situation where the market prices equally for credit
risk across tenors.
The liquidity price discount is then the idiosyncratic remainder between
the risk free price less the observed price on the one hand and the pure credit
price discount on the other, according to the decomposition (2.2), so that
p
(λit)
it = p
(γ)
it − pit − p(χi)it . (2.4)
These credit and liquidity premia can also be expressed in yield to maturity
terms by treating p
(·)
it as the price in the bond pricing formula (see equation
(2.7) in the Appendix) and then solving for the yield to maturity yit given the
underlying cash flows.
We have shown that observed bond yields can be decomposed into a risk
free component along with premia for credit risk and liquidity risk in the
manner described in this Section. The separation between credit and liquidity
premia is achieved through the use of a constant risk free asset swap margin.
The difference in par yield terms between the pure credit price and the risk-free
price is the credit premium; and the difference in par yield terms between the
market price and the pure credit price is the liquidity premium. Taking a step
back, it is clear that our decomposition method imposes minimal structure on
traded bond yield data, and yet provides an effective means through which to
extract credit and liquidity premia.
2.3 Risk premia in Australian bond yields
In this Section, we start by motivating the need for our method in practice.
Then we fit the zero coupon yield surface to Australian fixed income market
end of quarter revaluation pricing (2008Q1 to 2011Q3), as sourced from
Yieldbroker, and show an example of our decomposition method with Treasury
Corporation of Victoria bond yields and the zero coupon surface. We have
liquidity premia.
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restricted our sample to sovereign risk free bonds, semi-government bonds,
and supranational/agency bonds. The sample covers a total of 13 quarters,
with 37 unique issuers from the semi-government, supranational and agency
segment of the bond market, and 1,941 observations of end of quarter bond
yields.
The fixed income market pricing implied by observed yield curves incor-
porates a lot of information, not all of which is obvious. Figure 2.1 shows
Australian Government yields, as compared to Queensland Treasury Corpora-
tion (QTC) yields and Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW) yields. This
Figure illustrates market pricing for the bonds of each of the three issuers, and
therefore contains sufficient information for one to analyse whether the market
is pricing consistently for each issuer’s bonds. However, it is not obvious how
consistency in pricing should be assessed just by looking at the observed yields
(eg. is there an investment reason why QTC spreads are lower than KfW
spreads by the amount observed?). Further, the presence of coupons distorts
comparison between observed yields, and it is impossible to distinguish credit
spreads from liquidity spreads in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Observed yield curves, 31 March 2011
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Instead, the zero coupon yield surface is necessary. The zero coupon
15
surface makes it possible to assess consistency in the fixed income market and
decompose bond yields. Fundamentally, the surface is the true primitive of
the fixed income market, showing discount factors for all credit qualities at
all tenors. An example of the zero coupon surface is set out in Figure 2.2.
Intuitively, this graph shows that as far as the eyeball test is concerned, the
Figure 2.2: Zero coupon surface, 31 March 2011
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surface fits zero coupon yields fairly closely in March 2011. The remainder of
this Section is devoted to showing how surfaces like the one above fit Australian
fixed income market pricing data through time, and how they can be used to
decompose bond yields.
When the surface is fit to zero coupon yield, tenor and riskfree asset swap
margin triplets for each of the thirteen observation dates in our sample, we find
that it generally achieves an excellent fit to the zero coupon yields. Descriptive
16
statistics for errors it are provided in percentage terms by the Table 2.1. As
can be seen, the mean errors are all close to zero, indicating the surface is
unbiased. The quartiles show that the errors are relatively symmetric around
zero, but the minima and maxima do indicate the presence of a few outliers on
each sample date. Further, the root mean squared errors are all small, but they
did increase to a peak of 15 basis points in 2009Q2 (ostensibly as a result of
the turbulence in the Australian market associated with the Global Financial
Crisis and the introduction of the Australian Government’s guarantee on State
Government bond issuance, which operated to segment the market). Since
that time though, the errors have decreased, indicating the return of coherent
pricing. This Table provides strong evidence for consistency in Australian
fixed income market pricing, and facilitates the decomposition of observed
yields, which are of course predicated on a zero coupon surface that fits well.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics, surface fitting errors (per cent)
Date Min First Quarter Median Mean Third Quarter Max RMSE
2008-03-28 -0.0816 -0.0247 -0.0029 0.0000 0.0221 0.1032 0.0337
2008-06-30 -0.0803 -0.0109 0.0023 -0.0000 0.0129 0.0643 0.0222
2008-09-30 -0.1295 -0.0379 -0.0027 -0.0000 0.0222 0.3465 0.0655
2008-12-31 -0.1527 -0.0439 0.0051 -0.0000 0.0407 0.1915 0.0679
2009-03-31 -0.1607 -0.0392 -0.0056 0.0000 0.0319 0.2474 0.0641
2009-06-30 -0.5643 -0.0750 -0.0018 0.0000 0.0898 0.3480 0.1451
2009-09-30 -0.2499 -0.0618 0.0074 0.0000 0.0570 0.1921 0.0972
2009-12-31 -0.1735 -0.0277 0.0004 0.0000 0.0350 0.1196 0.0543
2010-03-31 -0.2113 -0.0474 0.0068 0.0000 0.0493 0.1640 0.0754
2010-06-30 -0.1440 -0.0345 -0.0028 0.0000 0.0368 0.1823 0.0606
2010-09-30 -0.0530 -0.0151 0.0003 0.0000 0.0136 0.0535 0.0216
2010-12-31 -0.1010 -0.0215 0.0035 0.0000 0.0211 0.0945 0.0321
2011-03-31 -0.0439 -0.0098 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0099 0.0431 0.0164
To that end, we turn now to the decomposition. Effectively, we use the
surface to provide a scalar to three element vector map from each observed
yield to the risk free component, credit yield premia and liquidity yield premia
associated or priced into that yield. Of course, this triples the result set from
our sample size to 5,823 yield components. Thus, for the sake of brevity, we
illustrate the decomposition for a cross section and time series of yields for a
selected issuer, namely the Treasury Corporation of Victoria (TCV).
Figure 2.3 shows how par yields can be broken down, both on a time series
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and cross sectional (yield curve) sense. As a general, rule observed yields
are higher than credit yields, which in turn are greater than risk-free yields –
implying positive liquidity and credit premia (in yield terms). To interpret
the graph, the red lines show observed yields, and the dashed green and blue
lines show the risk-free and credit yields under the decomposition, and are
the par yields that correspond to pγit and p
χi
it respectively. The vertical green
hatching shows the yield if the bond was issued by the government. The
slanted blue and red hatching show the discount/premium associated with
credit and liquidity risks respectively, under the zero coupon surface.
Figure 2.3: Decomposition, Treasury Corporation of Victoria yields
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In the TCV yield curve from March 2009, one can see that liquidity yield
premia are priced into the middle part of the curve, and the extremes of the
curve at both ends include liquidity discounts; while riskfree and credit yields
are broadly parallel across tenors. This is to be expected: short and long
tenor bonds tend to be thinly traded relative to medium tenor bonds. The
timeseries in the lower panel of Figure 2.3 shows the repricing of risk through
the GFC for the October 2022 TCV bond. While the credit premia priced into
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this bond according to our surface and identification assumptions appeared
to spike in during the GFC period around 2009, these were counterbalanced
by a compression of liquidity premia (to the point where there were liquidity
yield discounts) arising ostensibly from investors’ flight to quality in reaction
to the stressed market condition.
These graphs and the underlying decomposition illustrate the power and
flexibility of the zero coupon surface in facilitating fixed income investment
analysis. Further examples of the decomposition, for a representative suprana-
tional issuer (Inter-American Development Bank, IADB), and a representative
agency issuer (European Investment Bank, EIB), are set out in Figures 2.4
and 2.5. In both cases, these decompositions tell a similar story to that for
TCV which we have told here.
Figure 2.4: Decomposition, Inter-American Development Bank yields
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Now the important question arises as to whether the objects that we have
designated as credit and liquidity premia in our model, and represented as
such in our empirical analysis of Australian bond yields, actually correspond to
investors’ views on the credit and liquidity risks in individual bond lines. One
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Figure 2.5: Decomposition, European Investment Bank yields
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way to provide evidence in support of our claims is to regress our estimates of
credit premia from the zero coupon surface onto conventional determinants of
credit risk, such as credit ratings and measures of financial or fiscal position.
The same could be done for our liquidity premia estimates in relation to
bid-ask spreads and face value on issue. The results of these regressions could
then be strengthened with reference to surveys of financial market dealers and
investors of Australian semi-government, supranational and agency bonds.
Such an approach might be able to establish a definitive link between our
estimates and the underlying credit and liquidity risks implied by market
pricing. However, this approach ignores a fundamental philosophical point:
to the extent that the market is efficient, investors will have already priced
for all of this information in the outright level of yields or in spreads to
benchmark government bonds. Thus, the question of whether our credit and
liquidity premia estimates’ labels are justified is a circular one, in that credit
and liquidity premia may simply be in essence what investors deem them to
be. The important point is that our estimates are entirely consistent with
20
cross-sectional bond market pricing.
Instead, the preferable approach is therefore to explore how the zero coupon
surface and the underlying market pricing is capable of accommodating a range
of alternative views on credit and liquidity risk for particular bond lines and
issuers’ securities. One example of how this might work is as follows: Suppose
we wish to analyse a set of bonds of similar tenors, each issued by different
entities that nonetheless have broadly the same credit quality. Thus, we might
define our sample as all bonds of tenor between five and seven years issued by
the largest State government issuers (New South Wales Treasury Corporation
[NSWTC], Queensland Treasury Corporation [QTC], and TCV). Or we might
consider three to five year bonds issued by the significant supranational and
agency issuers (KfW, EIB and the Asian Development Bank [ADB]).
Once we have our sample, we can assume that the credit quality of these
bonds is priced across the different lines according to the surface. Hence,
we can use a constant slice of the surface that is perpendicular to the tenor
axis and parallel to the credit margin axis (ie. the opposite direction to the
decomposition presented above) to price the bonds and explore relative credit
and liquidity premia.6 In this setup, we set the tenor constant as the average
tenor of the bonds under consideration, as we believe that term risk has
an approximately equal effect across our sample of bonds. The setup also
implies that the risk-free asset swap margin will vary over a small interval
that captures the margins of the bonds being examined – this allows us to
control for variation in issuer credit quality.
The results of our analysis are presented in Figures 2.6 and 2.7, which
show line segments of the zero coupon surface (blue lines) from 31 March 2011
for the two samples of issuers mentioned above (long semis and short supras),
along with labelled points showing zero coupon yields estimated for each issuer
at equivalent tenors to those of their traded bonds. The residuals between the
line and the points can then be thought of as liquidity premia measured on a
relative basis within the sample of bonds, since we have controlled for credit
6Of course, to avoid solving across segments of the surface and reconstructing the NPVs
of traded bonds, we only consider zero coupon bonds of the same tenor as traded bonds
here, but this will suffice, as the zero coupon bonds have the highest delta with respect to
the underlying bonds, given their tenor.
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and term premia through our use of the zero coupon surface.
Figure 2.6: Relative pricing, long semi-government bonds
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These graphs illustrate our method for comparing the market pricing of
similar bonds (by issuer credit quality and tenor). They show how the zero
coupon surface can be used to evaluate the relative pricing of similar bonds.
The first (second) graph is predicated on a line segment of the zero coupon
surface with tenor set to 7.14 (3.58) years, corresponding to the average
tenor of the bonds in the sample. The graphs show that liquidity premia are
fairly idiosyncratic across issuers for long NSWTC, TCV and QTC bonds
with average tenor around seven years, but that EIB, KFW and ADB bonds
with tenors less than three and a half years tend to attract a liquidity yield
discount (price premium). Taking a step back, the sensitivity analysis of our
assumptions presented here suggests that the zero coupon surface is capable
of accommodating a wide range of assumptions about the underlying risks
that drive bond pricing.
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Figure 2.7: Relative pricing, short supranational and agency bonds
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2.4 Conclusion
We have shown that notwithstanding the effects of the Global Financial Crisis
on the Australian fixed income market, the zero coupon surface summarises
market pricing relatively well. This suggests that the market is pricing
consistently between issuers. Further, the decomposition shows that it is
possible to use the surface in more than one way to identify hitherto elusive
credit and liquidity premia.
We are not claiming that our decomposition necessarily represents the
underlying subjective premia that Australian bond investors charge for taking
on credit and liquidity risks. Instead, our aim here is to show that the
surface can be combined with identification assumptions to calculate credit
and liquidity yield premia in a consistent manner. As we have shown, the
surface is flexible to accommodate a wide range of assumptions. Indeed, this is
in keeping with the spirit of traditional relative value analysis in fixed income
markets, where the model is just a tool, an artifice for interpreting pricing in
an objective manner. There is, of course, no substitute for judgment.
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Appendix
Bootstrapping zero coupon yields The approach to bootstrapping taken
here is to blend zero coupon yields from deposit instruments with those from bond
yields. As deposit instruments are already zero coupon bonds, the only calculation
necessary for deposit rates is to convert them from simple interest to continuous
compounding. In this essay, we use the cash rate and one, three and six month
overnight indexed swap rates as the yields on deposit instruments.
The rest of the zero coupon yield curve is obtained by bootstrapping and
interpolating between bond yields or swap rates. A bond of any credit quality pays
the coupon c1, . . . , cn at evenly spaced tenors t1, . . . , tn and principal of $1 at time
tn. The bond price pn is then the sum of discounted interest payments and principal,
which can be written as
pn =
n∑
j=1
cjδj + δn, (2.5)
where δj ≡ e−rjtj and rj are the discount factor and zero coupon yield for tenor tj .
Assume δ1, . . . , δn−1 are known. Then, by solving (2.5) for δn, the following
bootstrap relation emerges (Hagan and West, 2006):
δn =
pn −
∑n−1
j=1 cjδj
1 + cn
⇒ rn = −1
tn
log
(
pn −
∑n−1
j=1 cjδj
1 + cn
)
. (2.6)
The next step is to convert all quoted bond yields from their native compounding
basis into continuously compounding equivalent rates yn. The initial guesses of the
zero coupon yields rn in the bootstrap relation are given by yn. Then the dirty
price of each bond is calculated with
pn =
n∑
j=1
cje
−ynti + e−yntn , (2.7)
where yn is the yield to maturity of bond with tenor n. These dirty prices are treated
as the bond prices pn in the bootstrap relation (2.6). Finally, discount factors are
interpolated at all coupon dates (due to the bootstrap framework, one can use any
interpolation method, but we use a standard approach – linear interpolation on log
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discount factors (Hagan and West, 2006)) and substituted into (2.6) to obtain new
estimations of rn. This final step should be iterated, and subsequent estimates of
rn will converge rapidly onto the desired zero coupon yield curve rt∀t.
As mentioned in the text, the process described here is repeated for all issuers
in the market, to derive a complete set of zero curves for the market. While this
does not pose any problems for riskfree Government bonds, further assumptions are
required on the default and recovery processes for the framework to be successfully
applied to yields on defaultable bonds (Jarrow, 2004).
Calculating riskfree asset swap margins Formally, the riskfree asset swap
margin χn is the difference between the net present value of a bonds’ cashflows cj
(where the discount factors δj used to calculate the net present value are taken from
the risk-free zero coupon yield curve) and the traded bond price pn, expressed in
basis point terms:
χn =
∑n
j=1 cjδj + δn − pn∑n
j=1 αjδj
, (2.8)
where αj is the day count fraction applicable to period j. It is also worth noting
for those familiar with fixed income markets that risk-free asset swap margins are
related to Z-spreads (Fabozzi, 1991).
Constructing thin plate regression splines A thin plate regression spline
is an approximation to a thin plate spline, which in turn is a multivariate smoothing
spline. The outline of thin plate regression splines set out here follows closely the
original exposition in Wood (2003). In the univariate case, suppose there is a model
ri = f(xi) + i, i = 1, . . . , n, (2.9)
where ri is the response variable, f is a smooth univariate function, xi is a single
covariate and i is a mean zero error term. Smoothing splines provide a method to
estimate the smooth function f such that it minimises the error and roughness of
the fit, so that
min
f
‖ r − f ‖ + σ
∫
f ′′(x)2dx, (2.10)
where r is a vector of ri’s, ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean norm, f are the corresponding
f(xi) values, and σ is the parameter that controls the tradeoff between fit and
smoothness.
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Thin plate splines generalise smoothing splines to include any finite number
d > 1 of covariates, and allow for higher orders of differentiation m satisfying 2m > d
in the roughness penalty (Wahba, 1990; Gu, 2002). In this case, the model becomes
ri = g(xi) + i i = 1, . . . , n,
where g : Rd → R is an unknown multivariate smooth function to be estimated, x
is a vector of length d from n ≥ d observations and i is again a zero mean random
error term. Thin plate splines estimate g by solving the problem
min
g
‖ r − g ‖ + σJmd(g) (2.11)
where r is the vector of zero coupon yields ri, g ≡ (g(x1), . . . , g(xn))′ is the smooth
unknown multivariate function to be estimated, Jmd(g) is a penalty measuring
the roughness of g, and σ controls the trade off between fit and smoothness. The
roughness penalty is defined in the general case as
Jmd(g) =
∫ ∞
−∞
. . .
∫ ∞
−∞
∑
ν1+...+νn=m
m!
ν1! . . . νd!
×
(
∂mg
∂xν11 . . . ∂x
νd
d
)2
dx1 . . . dxd. (2.12)
and in the bivariate case (d = 2,m = 2,g = g(x1, x2)) this reduces to
J2(g) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
(g2x1x1 + 2g
2
x1x2 + g
2
x2x2)dx1dx2. (2.13)
It can be shown that the thin plate spline g which minimises (2.12) and (2.13) is
characterised by the unknown parameter vectors ψ and φ which are estimated by
solving the problem
min
φ,ψ
‖ r − Eφ− Tψ ‖2 + σφ′Eφ, (2.14)
given the n × n and n × m weighting matrices E and T (subject to T ′φ = 0)
(Wahba, 1990). This multivariate problem is directly comparable with the univariate
smoothing spline problem: the term within the Euclidean norm captures fitting
errors, and the quadratic form is the roughness penalty.
The thin plate spline g can be shown to be an ideal smoother in the sense
that it characterises smoothness, determines the optimal tradeoff between fit and
smoothness, and finds the function that best meets this objective. On the other
hand g is of high rank, to the extent that there are as many parameters as there
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are data. This means that for d > 1 there are O(n2) operations for each thin plate
spline fit, and implies that estimation is significantly expensive in computational
terms.
Thin plate regression splines were introduced by Simon Wood in a series of
papers (Wood, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008; Marra and Wood, 2011) to solve the problem
with computational intractability in the estimation of thin plate splines. This is
achieved by forming a rank k low rank approximation to the parameter space and
restating the thin plate spline problem with this approximation. In other words,
the basis of φ is truncated to rank k, and the E matrix as it appears in the fitting
error and penalty term is adjusted in a consistent manner. Parameters are then
estimated by minimising given k the worst possible changes in the fitted values
and penalty induced by the approximation.7 The resulting thin plate regression
spline can be shown to be an optimal approximation to the thin plate spline, that
is computationally tractable because of the low rank parameter space.
7In this essay, we set k = 30 when we use thin plate regression splines to fit the zero
coupon surface. Havng experimented with different values for k, we find that this value
achieves the best balance between fit and parsimony, as evidenced in Table 2.1.
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Chapter 3
Conditional tests of
monotonicity in term premia
3.1 Introduction
From the perspective of market participants, term premia are the essence of
the Treasury yield curve.1 In the absence of term premia, investors would
be indifferent between Treasury bonds of different maturities, as would the
government in formulating its issuance strategy. Hence, to understand term
premia is to understand the dynamics of the yield curve.
Specifically, competing theories of the yield curve can be reduced to
three statements regarding term premia (Jarrow, 2010; Campbell et al., 1997).
According to the expectations hypothesis, term premia are non-existent because
expected returns are equal for all investment strategies in Treasury bonds. The
liquidity preference hypothesis holds that term premia increase monotonically
with tenor, due to investors demanding higher compensation for receiving
their principal later. The preferred habitat hypothesis assumes that investors
possess heterogeneous preferences across the yield curve, and that flows of
funds resulting from supply and demand at different parts of the curve lead
to general, non-monotonic relationships between term premia. Now, the
1Term premia represent the difference in expected returns from Treasury securities
of maturities greater than one period to market expectations of future monetary policy
movements, usually proxied by the single period Treasury yield.
28
expectations hypothesis has been rejected consistently in empirical studies
(Campbell and Shiller, 1991; Bekaert and Hodrick, 2001; Sarno et al., 2007),
so the appropriate task for a conditional test of term structure theories is to
distinguish between monotonicity and non-monotonicity in term premia, and
thereby discriminate between the liquidity preference and preferred habitat
hypotheses.
To choose between the competing theories, one might estimate a no-
arbitrage dynamic term structure model in order to decompose Treasury
yields into expectations of future monetary policy and term premia over time,
and then examine the model-based term premia (Duffee, 2002; Finlay and
Chambers, 2008; Wright, 2011). However, this approach is problematic because
any statistical test of the term structure theories applied to model-based term
premia is by definition a joint test of the model and the data. This diminishes
the scope of the findings of such a test. Further, the empirical efficacy of
a dynamic term structure model depends crucially on the flexibility of the
functional form of the factor risk premia in the model. But these factor
risk premia predetermine the model-based term premia estimates, and thus
predetermine the outcome of a test for the term structure theories. Researchers
have formulated increasingly flexible specifications for the factor risk premia
(Cheridito et al., 2007; Joslin et al., 2010, 2011), but these suffer from a
significant loss of parsimony.
The alternative approach is to construct a test for the shape of expected
term premia across tenors based solely on observed Treasury yields, without
imposing the a-priori structure of a term structure model on the data. As
Boudoukh et al. (1999a) and Patton and Timmermann (2010) recognise when
they proposed their Wolak and Monotonicity Relations tests respectively,
multiple inequality constraints tests provide an ideal platform for testing
the shape of expected term premia across tenors. These tests allow the
econometrician to consider simultaneously the empirical relationships between
term premia across all tenors in an effort to establish whether monotonicity
holds, whilst imposing minimal distributional assumptions and structure on
the underlying bond return data. As we will see later in this essay, the Wolak
test is based on a comparison of sample mean term premia with term premia
29
that are estimated under the condition that they be non-negative; and the
Monotonicity Relations test uses the insight that expected term premia must
be monotonically increasing across tenors if the minimum expected term
premium (of any tenor) is positive.
When conducting inequality constraints tests, the crucial problem is the
choice of the information set to be used as conditioning information. The
empirical literature on excess return forecasting offers importance guidance
here. It has been established that forward curve factors that are linear
combinations of forward rates implied by the current yield curve can be used to
forecast term premia (Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005), which are in turn related
to macroeconomic factors extracted from a panel dataset of macroeconomic
variables (Ludvigson and Ng, 2009). It is therefore appropriate to characterise
the conditioning information to be used in tests for monotonicity in term
premia on the forward curve and macroeconomic factors.2
Accordingly, we construct conditional tests of monotonicity in term premia
using information in the current yield curve and macroeconomic variables. The
tests are conditional versions of the Wolak test (Boudoukh et al., 1999a) and
Monotonicity Relations test (Patton and Timmermann, 2010) for monotonicity
in term premia. Given that the latter paper did not implement conditional
tests, and the earlier paper relied principally on an uninformative indicator
variable as the conditional information set, we improve the two extant tests
by using a comprehensive information set.
The results of our inequality constraints testing suggest that the use of
conditioning information changes the outcome of the tests from the uncon-
ditional case. Both the Monotonicity Relations and the Wolak tests suggest
that U.S. Treasury bill term premia are non-monotonic when unconditional
sample term premia are used. But when we condition our tests on the positive
elements of the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and Ludvigson and Ng (2009)
2In a recent paper, Duffee (2011) argues that an additional excess return forecasting
factor that can be derived in the context of a Gaussian dynamic term structure model.
This “hidden factor” contains information about expected returns, but is hidden from the
current yield curve, and appears to be unrelated to the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and
Ludvigson and Ng (2009) factors. We do not analyse Duffee’s hidden factor in any detail in
this essay.
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factors, the tests suggest that the conditional term premia are monotonically
increasing. The same effect is apparent, although to a lesser magnitude, when
we condition on both signs of the factors. This constitutes evidence that
the excess return forecasting factors do have explanatory power in respect of
the conditional shape of term premia. Further, our results indicate that the
conditional tests shed new light on how the monotonicity tests can be applied
to term premium data, by better capturing the information that appears
to influence market participants’ investment decisions when they determine
U.S. Treasury bill pricing.
This essay is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the conditions
necessary for monotonicity in term premia to hold, in order to frame an
argument for why monotonicity tests should be conditional on information
from the macroeconomy and the forward curve. Section 3.3 describes the
conditioning information and describes the construction of the tests. Section
3.4 applies the tests to observed U.S. Treasury bill yields. Finally, Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Determinants of term premia
At the outset, it is important to develop intuition around the economic forces
behind the liquidity preference hypothesis. To foreshadow the discussion in
this Section, the asset pricing theory identifies covariances between marginal
rates of substitution as the principal driver of term premia. The literature
then indicates that the current yield curve and macroeconomic variables may
be of use in testing for monotonicity in term premia.
Specifically, whenever covariances between the marginal rates of substitu-
tion are lower than zero and monotonically decreasing with tenor, it will be the
case that term premia are monotonically increasing in tenor (see eg. Boudoukh
et al. (1999b); the Appendix sets out full details). The intuition behind
this argument is that the marginal rates of substitution reflect intertemporal
consumption preferences, that in turn determine demand for bonds. A nega-
tive monotonically decreasing set of covariances indicates that agents value
consumption in the next period higher than consumption in later periods.
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They therefore demand short tenor bonds, which drives yields lower relative
to long tenor bonds, resulting in positive term premia. The opposite will hold
if the covariances are greater than zero and monotonically increasing.
Economic agents’ consumption and saving decisions depend on their prefer-
ences and on expected economic conditions (Varian, 1999). While preferences
are not directly observable, the asset pricing theory suggests that there is a
direct link between zero coupon bond prices and average stochastic discount
factors (see the Appendix). Hence, there should be information in the cur-
rent yield curve about the covariances between marginal rates of substitution
(Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005). Another determinant of the covariances is
economic conditions, as it is clear that the marginal rate of substitution is
affected by expectations of the business cycle and real activity in the economy
(Ludvigson and Ng, 2009; Hansen and Singleton, 1982). Thus, it is clear that
any test for monotonicity in term premia should utilise the information in
the current yield curve and the state of the macroeconomy as conditioning
variables.
The forward curve factor proposed by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) (‘CP
factor’) is an ideal candidate for use as conditioning information in tests
for monotonicity in term premia, because it summarises the information in
the current yield curve about expected term premia. Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005) and Kessler and Scherer (2009) experienced considerable success in
regressing Treasury excess returns of various tenors onto the CP factor, but
our focus will be on using the CP factor as conditioning information in the
conditional monotonicity tests. Ludvigson and Ng (2009) explored the extent
to which factors extracted from principal components analysis of a large panel
dataset of macroeconomic variables assists in explaining term premia alongside
the CP factor. The resulting economic factors (‘LN factors’) were found to
contain a significant amount of additional forecasting power to the CP factor
in capturing future variability in Treasury excess returns.
Apart from the CP and LN excess return forecasting factors, other ex-
planations have been put forward for the consumption and savings decisions
that drive the shape of term premia across tenors. A clear starting point is
supply and demand in the bond market. Possible measures of these forces
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in the bond market include net buying pressure (Bollen and Whaley, 2004)
and market flows (Vayanos and Vila, 2009), although these rely on tick level
trade data, which is difficult to source in over the counter fixed income mar-
kets. Additional economic influences on covariances between marginal rates of
substitution include learning (Sinha, 2010), subjective expectations (Xiong
and Yan, 2010), habits (Wachter, 2006) and structural breaks in the short
rate process (Bulkley and Giordani, 2011). However, because these factors are
unobservable and have uneven effects across term premia of different tenors,
it is arguable that the clearest empirical evidence that might be found in their
favour is a rejection of monotonicity in term premia.
3.3 Monotonicity tests
3.3.1 Testing framework and inputs
To fix notation and provide a formal statement of the liquidity preference
hypothesis, we start by defining p
(n)
t as the log riskfree zero coupon bond price.
Then the riskfree zero coupon yield is y
(n)
t ≡ −p(n)t /n. It follows that the log
holding period return on an n period bond is given by
r
(n)
t+1 ≡ p(n−1)t+1 − p(n)t .
The excess return rx
(n)
t+1 is the holding period return less the spot yield, and
corresponds to the trade where one borrows for a single period to finance an
investment in a long bond, which is unwound at the end of the period. It can
be written as
rx
(n)
t+1 ≡ r(n−1)t+1 − y(1)t .
Finally, the term premium δ
(n)
t+1 is the difference between adjacent excess
returns, so that
δ
(n)
t+1 ≡ rx(n)t+1 − rx(n−1)t+1 .
Now define ∆¯(n) ≡ E[δ(n)t+1]. Then the liquidity preference hypothesis, which
predicts that expected term premia are monotonically increasing, can written
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as
∆¯(i) > 0, for i = 2, . . . , n.
A natural statement of the liquidity preference hypothesis in the language of
statistical hypothesis testing is therefore
H0 : Any element of ∆¯ ≤ 0 HA : All elements of ∆¯ > 0. (3.1)
where the parameter is defined with ∆¯ ≡ (∆¯(2), . . . , ∆¯(n))′. These definitions
provide the basis for the monotonicity tests and facilitate the computation of
sample term premia from zero coupon yields.
Apart from sample term premia, the other input for our conditional
monotonicity tests comes from the conditioning information vector Zt, which
is defined as
Zt ≡ {CˆP t, LˆN t}.
In this expression, CP t is the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) forward curve
factor and LN t are the Ludvigson and Ng (2009) macroeconomic factors
(the Appendix sets out full details on how to estimate these factors). By
construction, there are no restrictions on the sign of the elements of Zt.
However, the inequalities in term premia to be tested will only be preserved if
the elements of the original conditioning information vector Zt are all positive.
To this end, we follow Boudoukh et al. (1993) and redefine the conditioning
information Zt as
Z∗t ≡ {Z+t , Z−t }
where the filters are Z+t ≡ max(0, Zt) and Z−t ≡ max(0,−Zt) so that Zt
captures all possible states of the world.
The conditioning information can then be incorporated into the excess
returns with the multiplication (Boudoukh et al., 1999a; Patton and Timmer-
mann, 2010)
rx
∗(n)
t+1 ≡ rx(n)t+1 ⊗ Z∗t . (3.2)
It is worth emphasising that this multiplication operation constitutes the
principal contribution of our research to the extant literature. Patton and
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Timmermann (2010) suggested that such an approach could be taken to
conducting conditional monotonicity tests, but did not actually perform
conditional tests. Boudoukh et al. (1999a) did use an approach akin to
equation (3.2) to condition their tests on the slope of the yield curve, but they
did not have the opportunity to incorporate the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)
and Ludvigson and Ng (2009) factors, because these factors had not yet been
proposed in the literature.
Finally, let ∆¯ ≡ (∆¯(1), . . . ∆¯(n))′ denote the vector of term premia across
tenors by where n is the longest tenor in the sample. Then conditional (uncon-
ditional) tests for monotonicity in term premia focus on the parameter ∆¯∗ (∆¯),
whose constituent sample means are based on the conditional (unconditional)
excess returns rx
∗(n)
t+1 (rx
(n)
t+1).
3.3.2 Monotonicity Relations test
Patton and Timmermann (2010) design their “Monotonicity Relations” test
around the fact that if the smallest difference in adjacent excess returns is
positive, then all differences must be positive and monotonicity must hold.
H0 : ∆¯ ≤ 0 HA : min
i=2,...,n
∆¯ > 0, (3.3)
where the minimum is taken on a piecewise basis across the conditional
expected values of the parameter ∆¯.3 The distribution of the test statistic,
which is the smallest average adjacent difference in excess returns, is obtained
with the stationary bootstrap of Politis and Romano (1994) (see Appendix).
3.3.3 Wolak test
The Wolak test is stated in different terms to the Monotonicity Relations
test. Instead of treating monotonicity as an alternative, the Wolak test posits
weak monotonicity under the null and sets an unrestricted alternative (Wolak,
3Romano and Wolf (2011) argue that this specification of the null hypothesis misses the
important case where the term premium is unrestricted but non-monotonic. We do not
attempt to address this potential problem with the Monotonicity Relations test specification
in this paper.
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1989), so that
H0 : ∆¯ ≥ 0 HA : ∆¯ unrestricted. (3.4)
The intuition behind the Wolak test is that if the sample term premia are
“close” in a statistical sense to artificial nonnegative term premia obtained
from the same sample, then the liquidity preference hypothesis must hold
(Boudoukh et al., 1999a). Again, full details are provided in the Appendix.
3.4 Monotonicity in U.S. term premia
In this Section, we apply the testing framework set out in the previous Section,
and implement the conditional tests for monotonicity in term premia on
U.S. Treasury bill excess returns conditional on the excess return forecasting
factors.4 Following Patton and Timmermann (2010) and Boudoukh et al.
(1999a), sample term premia are calculated with U.S. Treasury bill zero
coupon yields (tenors from two to eleven months) from the CRSP Fama–Bliss
bond files dataset.5 This dataset is most amenable to our study because there
is a long sample of historical data available. The series for the forward curve
factor and the macroeconomic factors are sourced from the respective authors’
websites.6 All zero coupon yield data and conditioning information factors
are sampled monthly, from January 1965 to December 2001, for a total of 420
observations. We use this sample period, with these particular start and end
points, in order to align our sample with Patton and Timmermann (2010)
(and the sample of the seminal Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) paper), so that
as far as possible our results are directly comparable. The sample mean term
premia, which form the basis for our tests, are depicted in Figure 3.1.
This Figure shows that sample mean term premia are not monotonically
4Thanks to Andrew Patton (Duke) for MATLAB code to perform unconditional Wolak
and Monotonicity Relation tests, which is available on his website. We have adapted this
code to perform the conditional tests and compute empirical power.
5The zero coupon Treasury bond yield dataset available on the Federal Reserve Board
website is an alternative source of data, and encompasses longer tenors than the Fama–Bliss
dataset.
6Thanks to Monika Piazzesi (Stanford), Sydney Ludvigson (NYU) respectively for making
the series, underlying data and associated MATLAB code available on their websites.
36
Figure 3.1: Sample mean term premia
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increasing in our sample. The sample mean term premia increase out to 6
months, but decrease between 7 and 8 months, and 9 and 10 months. This
provides a strong hint that the tests will reject monotonicity for the sample,
on an unconditional basis. A superficial empirical analysis of the liquidity
preference hypothesis might conclude at this point. However, a closer look
at the sample term premia data indicates a considerably more complicated
story. There is a significant amount of volatility in the term premia series,
as illustrated by the descriptive statistics for the sample term premia set out
in Table 3.1. The Table demonstrates that sample term premia are highly
dispersed, with large standard deviations and extreme minima and maxima.
This Table constitutes an important justification for bootstrap-based or
data-driven approaches for testing monotonicity, as it is unlikely that a parsi-
monious term structure model with non-latent state variables could adequately
fit these sample moments. Rather than making the restrictive assumptions
about the data generating process that are implied by term structure models,
the preferable approach is to let the dataset speak for itself, as it were. The
monotonicity tests impose minimal structure on the sample term premia,
and yet facilitate tests of the liquidity preference hypothesis that are entirely
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics, sample term premia (per cent)
Min 1Q Med Mean 3Q Max SD
2 months -0.3585 0.0009 0.0216 0.0274 0.0452 0.4393 0.0618
3 months -0.3522 0.0068 0.0349 0.0507 0.0783 0.8217 0.1044
4 months -0.5911 -0.0082 0.0361 0.0518 0.0913 1.1828 0.1470
5 months -0.7851 -0.0188 0.0482 0.0668 0.1255 1.5667 0.1963
6 months -0.9937 -0.0243 0.0560 0.0711 0.1479 1.8417 0.2361
7 months -1.3578 -0.0436 0.0498 0.0661 0.1654 2.1284 0.2790
8 months -1.4714 -0.0443 0.0708 0.0839 0.1995 2.4547 0.3238
9 months -1.6390 -0.0467 0.0784 0.0905 0.2243 3.0701 0.3750
10 months -2.3792 -0.0966 0.0665 0.0742 0.2174 3.2588 0.4253
11 months -2.5410 -0.1102 0.0698 0.0802 0.2515 3.6797 0.4650
consistent with these sample moments.
It is also important to recall that the unconditional sample means could
change if they reflected conditioning information. As suggested in Section 3.2,
one potential determinant of term premia dynamics could be the excess
return forecasting factors. These factors therefore provide an ideal source of
conditioning information for the monotonicity tests. In fact, the factors are
correlated with the term premia data, and this relationship (along with the
weight of the literature) suggests that they could play a role in conditional
tests of monotonicity. Table 3.2 sets out the correlation matrix.
Indeed, these correlations are borne out in the conditional sample means,
which are the unconditional sample means multiplied by the excess return
forecasting factors. In particular, Figure 3.2 shows how the conditional sample
means tend to become monotonically increasing when multiplied by some of
the factors. In interpreting this Figure, the unconditional sample means are
the sample averages of the raw term premia on Treasury bills. The other series
refer to the conditioning information that has been applied to (multiplied
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Table 3.2: Correlation matrix: excess returns and factors
CP LN CP LN
2 months -0.0197 0.2212 7 months 0.0901 0.2445
3 months 0.0117 0.2898 8 months 0.1009 0.2485
4 months 0.0610 0.2619 9 months 0.1017 0.2357
5 months 0.0890 0.2535 10 months 0.1336 0.2384
6 months 0.0960 0.2434 11 months 0.1192 0.2178
by) the unconditional sample means in each case.7 Figure 3.2 suggests that,
consistent with the excess return forecasting literature, the factors appear to
exert considerable influence on term premia. This provides strong impetus for
the need to conduct conditional tests of monotonicity based on these factors.
Figure 3.2: Sample mean conditional term premia
2 4 6 8 10 12
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
Tenor (months)
Pe
r 
ce
n
t
Unconditional
CP+
CP−
LN+
LN−
7Of course, when one considers the sample average of a single signed factor, one can just
append the plus and minus and one gets the sample average vector for the case where both
signs of the factors are conditioned upon.
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Turning now to the central results of our analysis, Table 3.3 sets out p-values
for the unconditional and conditional monotonicity tests. The unconditional
tests are the same as the ones conducted in Patton and Timmermann (2010)
(but for our slightly different sample end points). The conditional tests are
defined by which factor is used, for instance the factor “CP+” uses the positive
CP factors as conditioning information; and the factor “CP” comprises both
the CP+ and CP− factors. As there are eight LN factors (that correspond to
the first eight principal components of their macro panel dataset), we have
only used the first LN factor. The Table provides compelling evidence that
the acceptance or rejection of monotonicity by each test is influenced strongly
by the use of conditioning information.
Table 3.3: Monotonicity test p-values, by conditioning factor
None CP CP+ CP− LN LN+ LN−
Top less bottom 0.0532 -0.3100 0.1718 -0.0114 -0.0187 0.0925 -0.0032
t-test (t stat) 2.4873 -0.5710 2.7502 -0.2239 1.7701 2.6824 -0.4287
t-test (p-val) 0.0064 0.7160 0.0030 0.5886 0.9616 0.0037 0.6659
MR (p-val) 0.9540 0.9130 0.1830 0.9310 0.9880 0.0040 0.9950
Wolak (p-val) 0.0465 0.0000 0.8228 0.0663 0.0001 0.8300 0.0000
Bonferonni (p-val) 0.0206 0.0450 1.0000 0.0665 0.0023 1.0000 0.0011
When we consider the results of the conditional tests that use both signs
(the full factors, CP and LN), both the Wolak test and the MR test p-
values indicate that term premia do not increase monotonically across tenors.
Interestingly, the strength of the unconditional tests’ outcomes is magnified in
the conditional case. That is, the p-values indicate more or less significance
for the outcome each test respectively when conditioning on CP or on LN
relative to the unconditional case. This constitutes an initial indication that
conditioning on the factors affects the outcome of the test.
To push our analysis further, we have also conditioned on the signed
components of each factor separately.8 This enables us to study the impact of
8For comparison, we also include test outcomes for t-tests of the difference between the
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the signed components of the factors on the p-values in isolation, and should
thus help us to understand the underlying drivers of the test results. We find
that the positive and negative CP and LN factors give conflicting test results –
non-monotonicity tends to be rejected (not rejected) for the conditional sample
means by the MR test when conditioning on CP+ and LN+ (CP− and LN−).
Consistent results hold for the Wolak test, but in that test the hypotheses are
of course flipped (so care needs to be taken in interpreting the p-values).
Hence, our conditional inequality tests suggest that the signs of the factors
play a role in determining the monotonicity of term premia. Put another way,
our conditional tests show that the signs and magnitudes of the CP and LN
factors each appear to be correlated with the states of the world in which the
liquidity preference hypothesis holds.
Finally, we note that the power of the MR and Wolak tests in detect-
ing monotonicity is very high. This can easily be confirmed by imposing
monotonicity on the data and re-running the tests. Specifically, empirical
power is obtained by imposing monotonicity on the data, resampling from the
data according to the stationary bootstrap (Politis and Romano, 1994) and
calculating the test p-values from each bootstrap sample. Then the power is
reported as the proportion of monotonicity outcomes detected by the tests
over the bootstrap samples (where the p-value is less than [greater than] the
nominal test size of 0.05 for the t-Test and MR Test [Wolak Test]) out of the
total number of bootstrap iterations (200 in our case). To impose monotonicity,
we have followed Patton and Timmermann (2010) and added {1, 2 . . ., 10
basis points} multiplied by the step sizes of 0, 1 and 2 to every observation of
the 2 to 11 month sample term premia, respectively.
Table 3.4 compares the empirical power of the conditional and unconditional
tests. In this Table, as expected, the monotonicity outcome frequencies for
the t-test follow from the averages. Once we add the spreads, the differences
between sample average term premia across tenors widen. Hence, the t-test
almost always reports a significant difference (ie. monotonicity between the
longest tenor mean term premium and the shortest tenor mean term premium and for
Bonferroni bounds on the minimum t-test statistic across tenors. For details see Patton
and Timmermann (2010).
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Table 3.4: Empirical power: Frequencies of monotonicity outcome in tests
Factor (Step size) t-Test MR Test Wolak Test
None (0) 0.805 0.000 0.310
None (1) 1.000 0.165 0.900
None (2) 1.000 0.695 1.000
CP+ (0) 0.980 0.150 0.980
CP+ (1) 1.000 0.925 1.000
CP+ (2) 1.000 1.000 1.000
CP− (0) 0.085 0.000 0.485
CP− (1) 0.535 0.075 0.930
CP− (2) 0.920 0.310 0.995
LN+ (0) 0.965 0.565 1.000
LN+ (1) 1.000 1.000 1.000
LN+ (2) 1.000 1.000 1.000
LN− (0) 0.015 0.000 0.030
LN− (1) 1.000 0.635 1.000
LN− (2) 1.000 1.000 1.000
end point tenors) by the time we add a two basis point spread, no matter which
factor we are conditioning on.9 Given how they reflect the sample average
term premia, adjusted by the conditioning information and the spreads, the
t-test monotonicity outcome frequencies provide a benchmark for our MR and
Wolak test simulation experiments.
Now, we turn to the conditional experiments. As before, we can best
understand the empirical power results by separating out by the signs of
the conditioning factors. Considering the positive components of the CP
and LN factors for a given step size, we find that the monotonicity outcome
frequency is always higher for the MR and Wolak tests, when conditioning
on the CP+ and LN+ factors, relative to the unconditional case where no
9By the time a step size of two is used, 22 (11) basis points are added to every eleven (six)
month term premium relative to the two month term premium, thus effectively ensuring
monotonicity.
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factors are conditioned upon. Again, this suggests that conditioning on the
factors enables the inequality constraints tests to be better able to detect
monotonicity in the sample term premia data. The simulation results for the
tests that are conditioned on the negative factors are less conclusive. This is
because, given the sample averages, we expect a finding of non-monotonicity
where the step size is zero, and, as for the t-statistic simulations, the step sizes
take over when larger step sizes are applied to the spreads.
The key implication of our analysis in this Section is that it is preferable
to use a conditional test for monotonicity in term premia that reflects ex-ante
expectations by incorporating excess return forecasting factors than to use
an unconditional test on raw sample term premia. The signs of the factors
determine the outcome of the tests, and we have shown that the Wolak and
MR tests are more powerful when applied to conditional term premia data.
3.5 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that the sign and magnitude of the excess return
forecasting factors are a key determinant of monotonicity in U.S. term premia.
More broadly, our research provides an important confirmation of the utility
of the excess returns forecasting literature. While it is well known that the CP
and LN factors perform well in forecasting excess returns, we have used the
methodology of conditional multiple inequality constraints testing to show that
these factors also influence the shape of term premia across tenors. Finally,
we have shown that the empirical power of inequality constraints tests for the
liquidity preference hypothesis increases when the excess return forecasting
factors are used as conditioning information.
Returning now to the aim of this essay, our results suggest that the CP
and LN factors should be used as conditioning information when assessing
the empirical validity of the liquidity preference hypothesis in U.S. Treasury
bills. Our analysis also confirms the versatility of the MR and Wolak tests in
accommodating different forms of conditioning information.
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Appendix
Relating term premia to the pricing kernel The exposition here is based
on the theoretical framework set out in Boudoukh et al. (1999b). Let X
(n)
t be the
returns vector. Standard asset pricing theory states that in the absence of arbitrage,
the conditional expectation of the returns vector weighted by the stochastic discount
factor M
(n)
t is the unit of account (Duffie, 2001), so that
Et[X
(n)
t M
(n)
t ] = 1. (3.5)
A riskfree bond pays the unit of account in all states of the world, so by the
asset pricing formula (3.5), the bond price is equal to the conditional expectation of
the stochastic discount factor of matching tenor,
P
(n)
t =
1
Y
(n)
t
= Et[M
(n)
t ], (3.6)
where Y
(n)
t is the gross yield to maturity. The holding period return is the return
on an investment strategy to purchase a n period bond at time t and sell it at time
t+ 1 (when it is a n− 1 period bond),
R
(n)
t+1 =
P
(n−1)
t+1
P
(n)
t
=
Et+1[M
(n−1)
t+1 ]
Et[M
(n)
t ]
. (3.7)
The expected present value of the profit or loss of this trading strategy is the
expected price of the long bond at the beginning of the next period discounted back
to the present less the current price of the long bond
Et[P
(1)
t P
(n−1)
t+1 − P (n)t ]. (3.8)
Using equation (3.6) and the definition of covariance, it can be shown that the
expected profit or loss of the trading strategy equals the negative conditional
covariance between the spot stochastic discount factor and the forward stochastic
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discount factor
− Covt(M (1)t ,M (n−1)t+1 ) = Et[M (1)t ]Et[M (n−1)t+1 ]− Et[M (1)t M (n−1)t+1 ]
= Et[M
(1)
t ]Et[M
(n−1)
t+1 ]− Et[M (n)t ]
= Et[P
(1)
t P
(n−1)
t+1 − P (n)t ]. (3.9)
where the second line follows from the first due to the absence of arbitrage. Therefore,
the expected profit or loss that characterises the holding period return on the excess
returns trading strategy is driven by the covariances between the stochastic discount
factors. By dividing this relation through by P
(1)
t P
(n)
t or equivalently multiplying
by Y
(1)
t Y
(n)
t we can express it in terms of excess returns, which yields the relation
Et[R
(n)
t+1]− Y (1)t = −Covt(M (1)t ,M (n−1)t+1 )Y (1)t Y (n)t . (3.10)
Let p
(n)
t be the log n period bond price (or discount factor) at time t. Then
define
y
(n)
t ≡ −p(n)t /n,
r
(n)
t+1 ≡ p(n−1)t+1 − p(n)t ,
rx
(n)
t+1 ≡ r(n−1)t+1 − y(1)t ,
where y
(n)
t is the n period yield at time t, r
(n)
t+1 is the log holding return from buying
an n period bond at time t and selling it at time t+ 1 as an n− 1 period bond, and
excess returns over spot yields rx
(n)
t+1 are the log holding period returns on longer
period bonds less log spot yields. Now, a further linear approximation may be made
to get
Et[rx
(n)
t+1] ≈ −Covt(M (1)t ,M (n−1)t+1 ). (3.11)
The theory implies that term premia are driven by covariances between stochastic
discount factors of different tenors. Lucas (1978) showed that stochastic discount
factors can be interpreted as marginal rates of substitution between present and
future consumption. In particular, by equation (3.10) the liquidity preference
hypothesis
Et[R
(2)
t+1] < . . . < Et[R
(n−1)
t+1 ] < Et[R
(n)
t+1] (3.12)
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will hold whenever
Covt(M
(1)
t ,M
(n−1)
t+1 ) < Covt(M
(1)
t ,M
(n−2)
t+1 ) < . . . < Covt(M
(1)
t ,M
(2)
t+1) (3.13)
because Y
(1)
t Y
(n)
t is always positive and close to one.
Estimating the forward curve factor Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) discov-
ered a tent shaped pattern in the slope coefficients of regressions of excess returns
onto linear combinations of the spot rate and forward rates
rx
(i)
t+1 = β
(i)
0 + β
(i)
1 y
(1)
t + β
(i)
2 g
(2)
t + . . .+ β
(i)
n g
(n)
t + 
(i)
t+1, i = 2, . . . , n (3.14)
where g
(n)
t ≡ p(n−1)t − p(n)t is the log forward rate. This led to the idea that a single
linear combination of the spot rate and forward rates explains excess returns across
tenors, which can be expressed via the specification
rx
(n)
t+1 = bnCP t + 
(n)
t+1, CP t ≡ γ0 + γ1y(1)t + γ2g(2)t + . . .+ γng(n)t , (3.15)
Now, in this specification, bn and γ(·) are not separately identified, but estimation
can proceed by restricting the average value of bn to be 1, and regressing the average
excess returns across tenors onto the linear forward rates,
rxt+1 = CˆP t + t+1, rxt+1 ≡ 1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
rx
(i)
t+1, i = 2, . . . , n. (3.16)
The forward curve factor is then defined as the fitted values CˆP t for this regression.
Estimating macroeconomic factors Suppose there is a panel of macroeco-
nomic variables hit with the approximate factor structure,
hit = λ
′
ift + eit, (3.17)
where λi are factor loadings, ft are macroeconomic factors, and eit is the error
process. The factors ft are estimated with principal components analysis
min
ft
(ht − Λft)2,
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where ht is a cross sectional vector of macroeconomic variables and Λ is a vector of
factor loadings.
In this context, Ludvigson and Ng (2009) devised a procedure for selecting the
macroeconomic factors which possess optimal explanatory power in respect to term
premia. Specifically, the optimal subset LˆN t of ft that spans the space of ft can
be chosen by forming different subsets LˆN
(s)
t of ft and evaluating the Bayesian
Information Criterion of the regression models
rx
(n)
t+1 = αCˆP t + β
′LˆN
(s)
t + γt.
Despite the use of factors as explanatory variables in this regression, ordinary least
squares can still be shown to lead to consistent coefficient estimates (Bai and Ng,
2006). The LˆN
(s)
t with the lowest Bayesian Information Criterion is chosen as LˆN t.
An economic interpretation of the factors LˆN t can be obtained by considering the
marginal R2 of regressions of factors onto each component of the macroeconomic
variable panel. In this essay, for the sake of simplicity, we do not follow the procedure
of Ludvigson and Ng (2009). Instead, we use treat the first principal component of
ft as LˆN t.
Implementing the monotonicity relations test As above, let the sample
equivalents of the term premia postmultiplied by the conditioning information
be denoted ∆¯∗. Patton and Timmermann (2010) mentioned the possibility of
incorporating conditioning information in this way into their implementation of
the Monotonicity Relations test, but did not pursue this idea any further. We
implement the test with the forward curve factors and macroeconomic factors as
conditioning information.
Applying the alternative hypothesis to the sample term premia10 leads to the
test statistic
JT = min
i=2,...,n
∆¯(i). (3.18)
The Monotonicity Relations test avoids the approximations that follow from the
large sample theory of the test statistic JT by instead obtaining critical values for
the test with a bootstrap (Patton and Timmermann, 2010). Let the returns data
10Romano and Wolf (2011) critique the monotonicity relations test on the basis that non-
monotonicity in the context of expected asset returns really means that adjacent differences
in returns are unrestricted, not just less than or equal to zero.
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be denoted
{r(i)t+1, t = 1, . . . , T − 1; i = 2, . . . , n}.
A stationary bootstrap (Politis and Romano, 1994) can then be implemented by
drawing a new sample of returns across all tenors with a randomly selected time
index from the original data
{r˜(i)τ(t+1)(b), τ(1), . . . , τ(T − 1); i = 2, . . . , n},
where b is an index for the bootstrap iteration number {b : 1, . . . , N} such that N
is large. This resampling process preserves the cross-sectional dependence in the
returns data. Time series dependence is accounted for by resampling in a block,
where the block length is a random variable drawn from a geometric distribution
with a random starting point. This gives the bootstrap distribution of ∆ˆt+1.
The null (∆¯ = 0) is imposed by subtracting ∆¯(i) from the bootstrap sample
equivalents ∆¯(i)(b). A count is then made of the number of times when a pattern in
the bootstrapped samples emerges that is at least as unfavourable relative to the
null as that observed in the real data. This leads to the bootstrapped test statistic
and p-value
JT (b) = min
i=2,...,n
(∆¯i(b)− ∆¯(i)), b = 1, . . . , B (3.19)
pˆ =
1
B
B∑
b=1
1{JT (b)>JT }. (3.20)
Under this test framework, the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the liquidity
preference hypothesis when the p-value is less than 5%.
Implementing the Wolak test Drawing on the Wolak test, Boudoukh et al.
(1999a) formulate a conditional test of the liquidity preference hypothesis. They
postmultiply ∆¯(i) by the conditioning information Z∗t and apply the law of iterated
expectations to restate the null hypothesis as
(∆¯− θ)⊗ Z∗t ≥ 0, (3.21)
where the parameter θ ≡ (θ1, . . . , θn−1) ∈ R(n−1)+ is positive under the null.
The parameter θ is estimated as the sample means of the term premia in equation
48
(3.4) conditional on Z∗t , so that
θˆ = ∆¯× Z∗t ≥ 0. (3.22)
There is no restriction on the sign of these estimates, and they may be negative either
because the null is false or because sampling error is present. Let the covariance
matrix of the sample moment vector be denoted Ω. This covariance matrix may
have non-zero entries off the diagonal, and therefore account for cross-correlation,
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the series. In this context, Boudoukh
et al. (1993) show that the vector θˆ is asymptotically normal with θˆ
a∼ N(θ,Ω). To
implement the Wolak one need not know Ω. Instead, a consistent estimate of the
sample covariance matrix Ωˆ will suffice. This estimate may be derived with the
Newey–West procedure among others.
The sample mean θˆ needs to be estimated under the restriction that it be
nonnegative. Following Boudoukh et al. (1993) the restricted sample mean θˆR can
be written as the solution to the problem
min
θˆR
Q = (θˆR − θˆ)′Ω−1(θˆR − θˆ), (3.23)
subject to θˆR ≥ 0. Finally, to test the liquidity preference hypothesis θ ≥ 0 with a
multivariate one-sided Wald statistic, calculate
W ≡ T (θˆR − θˆ)′Ωˆ−1(θˆR − θˆ). (3.24)
This statistic is evaluated at an appropriate level of significance, using the asymptotic
distribution
N∑
k=0
Pr[χ2k ≥ c]× w
(
N,N − k, Ωˆ/T
)
, (3.25)
where c ∈ R+ is the critical region for a given size, N is the number of inequality
restrictions, and the weight w(N,N − k, Ωˆ/T ) is the probability that θˆR has exactly
N − k positive elements.
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Chapter 4
Measuring monetary policy
expectations
4.1 Introduction
Expectations of future movements in monetary policy play a crucial role in
the policy setting process, and the policy transmission mechanism (Woodford,
2010). Of course, expectations are unobservable, and may differ from one
economic agent to the next. Nonetheless, as many researchers and practitioners
have recognised, financial markets provide a convenient medium through which
to measure policy expectations, because market prices for many different
financial instruments are sensitive to future movements in policy.
Within the universe of financial instruments, it is clear that fixed income
securities bear the closest relation to policy settings, and therefore constitute
the best type of financial instrument for measuring policy expectations. Intu-
itively, the entire fixed income market can be conceptualised as a collection of
signals related to private sector expectations of future movements in monetary
policy. The pricing of fixed income securities provides a real time, albeit noisy,
market based measure of monetary policy expectations. The noise arises from
the presence of risk premia that differ in magnitude according to the particular
term, credit and liquidity risks that are associated with each traded fixed
income security. Therefore, if one has a means to abstract away from these
50
risk premia, then one can directly measure monetary policy expectations in
the traded yields of fixed income securities.
This essay presents an empirical framework for extracting the signal on
monetary policy from fixed income market pricing. While it is widely known
that the market prices fairly well for movements in the policy instrument over
a horizon of up to six months, an application of our framework to Australian
fixed income pricing shows that the policy expectations embedded in liquid
securities of tenor up to three years still retain a fair degree of accuracy.
Our work addresses an important gap in the literature. While the extant
literature acknowledges the existence of risk premia in market pricing for
financial instruments, there is no purely empirical way to abstract away from
those risk premia when evaluating the accuracy of market expectations with
regard to future policy movements. Many authors have fit affine term structure
models augmented with survey data on expectations (Kim and Wright, 2005;
Kim and Orphanides, 2005; Finlay and Chambers, 2008; Lee Chun, 2011), but
these models often assume restrictive functional forms for risk premia and
stochastic processes for the short rate. Another stream of the literature looks
at money market and interest rate futures pricing (Kuttner, 2001; Gu¨rkaynak
et al., 2007; Goodhart and Lim, 2011), but does not suggest a way to strip
out risk premia in such pricing (Piazzesi and Swanson, 2008; Hamilton, 2009)
without relying on exogenous sources such as survey data (Ichiue and Yuyama,
2009). The foreign exchange market (Engel and West, 2005; Fatum and
Scholnick, 2006) and stock market (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005) literature
on policy expectations can be put to one side, as these markets only have an
indirect or tangential relation to monetary policy. Some research has been
conducted on the extraction of expectations from bond and swap markets
(Nagano and Baba, 2008; Joyce et al., 2008; So¨derlind and Svensson, 1997) and
bond options (Vahamaa, 2005), which are highly sensitive to movements in the
policy instrument. But this research has not proposed an adequate method
for controlling for the term premia and the credit and liquidity premia that
are often priced into the longer term fixed income securities used as inputs
into their curve construction efforts. Finally, hybrid approaches have been
proposed that combine elements of the Taylor rule with market pricing to
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measure expectations (Smith and Taylor, 2009; Taylor, 2010; Hamilton et al.,
2011). While these approaches reflect central banks’ price stability and full
employment objectives, they do not fully reconcile the difference in frequency
between macro-economic variables pertaining to the output gap and inflation
expectations on the one hand, and fixed income market pricing on the other.
We construct an empirical framework for measuring the explanatory power
of a wide range of fixed income securities, including liquid money market
securities, short term interest rate futures and Treasury bond futures in
relation to movements in monetary policy. Following Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007),
yields and implied forward rates extracted from market pricing for each of the
different fixed income securities under consideration are compared to the cash
rate when grossed up or averaged over the appropriate horizon in an effort to
see how accurately the market prices for policy movements. Specifically, the
implied cash rate is regressed onto the yields and implied forward rates with
ordinary least squares (OLS), where the cash rate is the dependent variable in
the regression to reduce measurement error (Fama, 1975). When the yields
and forwards are subject to additional risk premia, the rates are combined
as instruments and regressors in an instrumental variables (IV) specification
that strips out the effect of risk premia and thereby identifies the underlying
signal on policy expectations in market pricing. The IV model is estimated
with the generalised method of moments (GMM).
We apply this approach to examine market pricing in Australia for policy
movements over horizons of up to three years, in contrast to the vast majority
of the literature on market-based measures of policy expectations (with the
exception of Goodhart and Lim (2011), who examine short to medium term
policy expectations priced into the United Kingdom interest rate swap curve
and government bond curve). While extant studies of Australian interest rates
have focused on term premia (Walsh and Tan, 2008; Guido and Walsh, 2005),
yield curve forecasting (Bilson et al., 2008; Murik, 2006), and the short rate
process (Gray and Smith, 2008; Sanford and Martin, 2006; Treepongkaruna
and Gray, 2006; Chan, 2005; Gray, 2005; Treepongkaruna and Gray, 2003),
our work constitutes the first empirical examination of policy expectations in
the Australian fixed income market. In particular, our approach complements
52
the literature on estimating and forecasting the policy rate according to the
short rate process by incorporating information from many different classes of
fixed income securities, whose tenors span the entire yield curve.
We find that overnight indexed swaps outperform other fixed income
securities at forecasting the Australian cash rate over the nearest two quarters,
with one month ahead root mean squared forecast errors inside the typical 25
basis point cash rate movement. Beyond that, accuracy drops off substantially
over longer horizons. The OLS regressions show that some of the influence
of risk premia can be incorporated into the intercept term for each security,
thus improving the forecast efficacy of all of the Australian fixed income
securities. However, these regressions still leave much of the variation in the
cash rate unexplained, especially over longer horizons of up to three years.
The GMM IV framework allows us to address this problem by instrumenting
the bond futures pricing with overnight indexed swap rates and implied yields
on interbank futures contracts. Using our GMM IV framework, we find that
the bond futures pricing contains policy expectations that forecast the average
of future movements in the Australian overnight cash rate over horizons of
one to three years from 2004 to 2010 to well within 75 basis points.
The remainder of the essay is organised as follows. Section 4.2 constructs
the measures of monetary policy expectations. Section 4.4 estimates the
measures with Australian data and Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Measuring expectations
The essence of our approach is as follows. Suppose that, in implementing our
model, we have perfect foresight of the cash rate. That is, in each period
of our sample, we know the cash rate for all other periods of the sample.
Then we can use OLS equations to compare the ex post average cash rate to
market implied yields and forward rates (‘market yields’) in order to gauge
the accuracy of traded fixed income securities in forecasting the cash rate.1
1The use of returns on financial securities to gauge private sector expectations of future
movements in monetary policy can be justified with reference to standard asset pricing
theory (Gu¨rkaynak et al., 2007). See the Appendix for an exposition.
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Where market pricing is subject to noise from risk premia, we employ GMM IV
estimators to assist in isolating the portion of market yields that pertain solely
to expectations. The use of GMM IV estimators constitutes the principal
contribution of our work to the literature. This Section describes the approach
in detail.
Following the notation in Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007), let it be the overnight
cash rate at time t and define the average cash rate as
ı¯t,t+k ≡
t+k−1∏
j=t
(1 + ij)− 1 ≈ 1
k
t+k−1∑
j=t
ij
Assuming that the daily cash rate through the entire sample is known, we can
calculate ı¯t,t+k for any t and k within the sample. Let r
s
t,t+j,t+k be the forward
rate implied by time t pricing on fixed income security s for a loan beginning
at time t+ j and ending at time t+ j + k. This notation encompasses zero
coupon yields, where j = 0. For money market securities, quotes are already
given as zero coupon rates and forward rates. For short term interest rate
futures and Treasury bond futures, quotes are converted to implied yields.
By selecting appropriate starting points t and horizons k, we then compute
returns on the monetary policy instrument ı¯t+j,t+k such that they line up with
the corresponding forward rates rst,t+j,t+k implied by market pricing for all
fixed income securities s at all times t in the sample. This leads to the central
linear model to be used in this study (Gu¨rkaynak et al., 2007; Goodhart and
Lim, 2011), which compares forward rates implied by the market pricing of
fixed income securities to returns on the cash rate over the corresponding
period:
ı¯t+j,t+k = α + βr
s
t,t+j,t+k + 
s
t,t+j,t+k. (4.1)
This equation corresponds to the asset pricing theory (see the Appendix for
details), but the cash rate is on the left hand side (so the risk premium is
the negative intercept where the slope coefficient is one). This is reasonable
because to the market, rst,t+j,t+k is known at time t, whereas ı¯t+j,t+k is not.
Furthermore, Fama (1975) regressed inflation onto interest rates to mitigate
measurement error in inflation. Similarly, we put the cash rate on the left
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hand side of the regression specification to mitigate the ex-post to ex-ante
measurement error.
It can be shown that the error term t in this specification incorporates the
risk premium ρ
(s)
t,t+k (see the Appendix), thereby allowing for variation over
time in the risk premium without affecting the integrity of the model. The
model (4.1) provides the central empirical framework for this paper. The idea
is to use this model to assess the extent to which variability in the monetary
policy instrument is explained by market pricing on various fixed income
securities. Specifically, the goodness of fit of the model and the behaviour of
its error term for different assets provide measures of the accuracy of financial
market expectations regarding future movements in monetary policy.
The error term st,t+j,t+k is fundamental to the specification of the central
linear model. Depending on the particular characteristics of security s, this
error term may contain time varying, security specific risk premia; which may
cause the model to be mis-specified. Our solution for this problem is to use
instrumental variables. Specifically, we recast model (4.1) as an instrumental
variables regression, so as to derive a composite measure of fixed income
expectations for future monetary policy. This measure combines the accuracy
of the short term securities and the liquidity of the long term securities. Hence,
market yields for securities s1 that are subject to risk premia are instrumented
by corresponding market yields over the same time horizon for securities s2
that are not subject to the risk premia. The following instrumental variables
specification emerges,
r
(s1)
t,t+j,t+k = δ + γr
(s2)
t,t+j,t+k + ζt
ı¯t,t+j,t+k = α + βr˜
(s1)
t,t+j,t+k + υt, (4.2)
where r˜
(s1)
t,t+j,t+k ≡ δ + γr(s2)t,t+j,t+k.
The validity of the instrumental variables specification is predicated on the
quality of the market yields on the s2 securities as instruments. To satisfy the
qualities of a good instrument, the market yields on the s2 securities must be
orthogonal to the risk premia in the s1 securities, and must be correlated with
the portions of the market yields on the s1 securities that reflect investors’
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pricing for future movements in the cash rate. It is therefore appropriate to
conduct tests for weak instruments to assist the construction of the market
based measures of policy expectations. Specifically, a simple F -test for an OLS
regression of long yields onto short (instrument) yields will be used (Stock
et al., 2002).
Having performed tests for weak instruments, we proceed to estimate the
IV model (4.2) with the generalised method of moments (GMM). The GMM
moment conditions for market yields of horizon k are then
gT,k(α, β) ≡ 1
T
T∑
t=1
[it,t+k − α− βr(s1)t,t+k]⊗ r(s2)t,t+k. (4.3)
The GMM instrumental variables approach is effective in this context because
the market yields on the short term securities are correlated with the market
yields on the overnight rate, but are uncorrelated with the extra risk premia
that affect long term securities. The result is a revision of the original OLS
regression model (4.1) that combines the best of both worlds, in that it
incorporates both the accuracy of short term securities with the liquidity of
long term securities. Also, GMM has better asymptotic properties than two
stage least squares, and there is an exact solution in the linear case, meaning
that the system is just-identified (Hayashi, 2000).
We conclude this Section by comparing our approach to the literature.
Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007) and Goodhart and Lim (2011) use model (4.1) to
consider which financial market security provides the most accurate monetary
policy expectations from a broad set of fixed income securities and derivatives.
They made adjustments to the model to account for the use of securities
referenced over forward interest rates, and to correct for cointegration between
the overnight rate and market yields for other fixed income securities. However,
they did not adapt the framework to deal with what are arguably the strongest
impediments to the use of the model in practice — the lack of liquidity on a
duration adjusted basis in short term securities that are directly related to the
overnight rate, and the contamination of market yields on more liquid longer
term securities by risks that are beyond the scope of the basic asset pricing
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theory. Our empirical framework provides a means to address these issues.
Finally, we note that there is a clear portfolio management interpretation
of the central linear model and its underlying economic intuition. Suppose
a fixed income investor wants to trade at time t over the time horizon t+ j
to t+ k, where j may be equal to zero. Based on her preferences in respect
of term, credit and liquidity risks, and the characteristics of security s, the
investor decides to trade security s. Whilst other securities may act as a
benchmark for s, the most fundamental counterfactual is the cash rate. In
other words, the investor can substitute a strategy to invest in rst,t+j,t+k with
a strategy based on ı¯t+j,t+k. For this reason, our empirical framework actually
reflects investment decisions that fixed income portfolio managers make in
practice.
4.3 The fixed income universe
Having presented the modelling framework, we turn to a discussion the various
Australian money market and fixed income securities that will be used to
implement the instrumental variables regression. The overnight cash rate is
the Australian monetary policy instrument, and will be used as it. Short term
instruments s2 which correspond to zero coupon bonds and futures contracts
with tenor less than one year and always use simple compounding include:
Overnight indexed swaps An interest rate swap where the floating rate is
the monthly average overnight cash rate. Illiquid but directly related to
overnight cash rate.
Bank bills A short term borrowing instrument of a major financial institution.
Liquid but subject to credit risk.
Interbank futures A futures contract written on the average monthly overnight
cash rate. Illiquid but directly related to overnight cash rate.
Bank bill futures A futures contract written on the three month bank bill
rate set. Highly liquid but subject to credit risk.
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The principal long term instrument s1 that we use in our study are Trea-
sury bond futures contracts. These contracts summarise the pricing in the
Australian Treasury yield curve, and are far more liquid than the underlying
Treasury nominal bonds.2 Market participants actively use bond futures to
hedge their interest rate exposures. For this reason, the bond futures contracts
are a more reliable indicator of fixed income market pricing for term interest
rate risk than the interest rate swap curve, which also include an element of
counterparty risk.
These traded short and long term instruments are all sensitive in differ-
ent ways to the overnight cash rate, and thus pricing for each instrument
necessarily sheds light on the fixed income markets’ expectations regarding
future movements in monetary policy. The judicious application of our GMM
instrumental variables framework in combining instruments and regressors to
control for risk premia should assist in extracting and evaluating the market’s
expectations in each case.
4.4 Expectations in Australian bond pricing
In this Section, we apply the empirical framework for assessing the accuracy
of expectations in fixed income pricing to the Australian market. Data on the
pricing of Australian fixed income securities is sourced from Reuters. Rates
for are collected daily from 1 January 2004 to 22 October 2010, a total of
1,735 observations. The cash rate series is sourced from the Reserve Bank of
Australia.3
At the outset, Figure 4.1 depicts selected rates from our dataset. It is clear
2Our use of bond futures incorporates the futures to physical basis, and also prices
for coupon payments rather than being a direct reflection of Treasury zero coupon yields.
However, given the status of the bond futures as the primary mechanism for price discovery
in the Australian fixed income market, we believe that the bond futures are preferable to
the underlying Treasury bonds for use in our study. Note that the bond futures data (along
with interbank and bank bill futures data) used in our study have been adjusted to smooth
for roll trades and associated price volatility around the expiry date.
3While it is always better to use longer sample periods in studies of this nature, we note
that interbank futures first commenced trading on the Australian Securities Exchange in
August 2003. Hence, to include this fundamentally important futures contract in our study,
we commence our sample in January 2004.
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that the short end rates tend to track the cash rate very closely, but also that
in 2008, the implied yields on 3Y and 10Y bond futures fell dramatically, well
before the cash rate was cut by the RBA. Similarly, the pricing on bond futures
seemed to anticipate the normalisation of the monetary policy instrument
from late 2009 onwards. Of course, these market movements in the bond
futures pricing may reflect risk sentiment or market reactions to Australian
economic fundamentals as opposed to interest rate expectations. Nonetheless,
our aim in this Section will be to apply our GMM IV empirical framework in
an analysis of the expectations embedded in the market pricing of the different
fixed income securities in our sample.
Figure 4.1: Fixed income market pricing
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As is generally the case with yield panel data, the rates on fixed income
securities depicted in Figure 4.1 appear to be non-stationary and co-integrated.
These statistical properties in the data have the potential to affect the results
of our econometric analysis. However, in separate results not reproduced
here, we have confirmed the robustness of our modelling to the presence of
non-stationarity and co-integration in the yield.4 Further, we also confirmed
4Specifically, Augmented Dickey–Fuller tests with a single lag show that the yields in our
dataset are non-stationary in levels, but are stationary in first differences. Nonetheless, the
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that our analysis is robust to the presence of the structural breaks in the series,
which were caused by the Global Financial Crisis.5
Armed with this set of time series, we next construct implied forwards
from the cash rate series that correspond to the market pricing quotes for each
class of fixed income securities under consideration. We illustrate the root
mean squared errors for the short end securities. Figure 4.2 shows the root
mean squared forecast errors of the forward rates of short end instruments
of different tenors relative to the actual cash rate over the corresponding
periods. Note that this Figure only includes instruments with a tenor of less
than one year. It is clear that the overnight indexed swap rates contain the
most accurate set of cash rate forecasts out to six months. However, there
is a surprising degree of dispersion in accuracy between the different short
end instruments. Specifically, bank bill futures outperform bank bills, and
interbank futures appear to be less accurate than overnight indexed swaps.
Table 4.1 drills down into the descriptive statistics for the underlying
forecast errors by instrument, that also underpin the RMSE graph. In the
Table, “OIS” stands for overnight indexed swap, “BAB” denotes bank bills,
“YIB” refers to monthly interbank futures (the Australian equivalent to futures
on the federal funds rate), “YBA” stands for quarterly bank bill futures, and
“YTT” and “YTC” denote three year and ten year Treasury bond futures,
respectively. The suffixes “#m” and “c#” indicate the tenor in months and
futures contract number, respectively. The Table shows how forecast errors
tend to fan out by tenor, and also illustrates the manner in which risk premia
combinations of yields that are used in our main results generally imply two co-integrating
relations according to the Johansen maximum eigenvalue and trace tests. While these
co-integrating relations may not be entirely consistent with our parameter estimates from
the OLS and GMM IV models, they confirm the existence and strength of the empirical
relationships between the cash rate and the fixed income market pricing variables under
consideration in our study.
5We used empirical fluctuation processes (Zeileis et al., 2002) to determine that the
parameters of OLS relationships between the fixed income market yields and the cash rate
change through time. One way to address these changes is to break down the sample into
subsamples. Instead, we stochastically detrended our yield dataset, and re-run our models.
Here, we do not find an improvement in the fit of the GMM IV model to the detrended
data. Further, we consider that any benefits of stochastic detrending are outweighed by
the clarity with which the original non-detrended model can be interpreted, and its direct
connection to market pricing.
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Figure 4.2: Short end root mean squared forecast errors
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dilute the signal on expectations from one type of fixed income security to the
next. For example, as one would expect, OIS and interbank futures tend to
have the smallest mean forecast errors, whereas bank bills have slightly larger
mean forecast errors, which reflect credit risk. Also, beyond the six month
horizon, the accuracy of forecasts tend to wane substantially, suggesting that
term premia and other risk premia play an increasingly important role in
determining forward rates at longer tenors.
When we reach the tenors beyond one year, we need to put aside the
short end instruments (OIS, BAB, YIB and the first four YBA contracts)
because they ostensibly do not directly price for longer term expectations.
However, the three year and ten year bond futures contracts, YTTc1 and
YTCc1 respectively, clearly span the horizon of between one and three years
which is of interest to us. We can posit that the implied yields on three year
and ten year bond futures contracts contain information on expectations over
horizons of one year, two years and three years (hence the 1Y, 2Y and 3Y
suffixes to YTTc1 and YTCc1 in Table 4.1),6 and then compare the implied
6We also note here that, to accommodate the long horizons, the dataset for the one, two
and three year horizons end in October 2009, 2008 and 2007 respectively, to ensure that the
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yields to the average cash rates over these horizons for each day in our sample.7
The performance of the three and ten year futures in forecasting the average
cash rate over these horizons is nonetheless poor, as suggested by the large
interquartile ranges and forecast error standard deviations for these contracts
in the Table.
Table 4.1: Forecast error descriptive statistics
Series Min 1Q Med Mean 3Q Max SD
OIS.1m -0.2762 0.0115 0.0175 0.0411 0.0300 0.8759 0.0985
OIS.3m -0.2720 0.0200 0.0500 0.1042 0.1100 1.0910 0.2088
OIS.6m -0.2902 -0.0090 0.0825 0.1802 0.1851 2.5010 0.3921
BAB.1m -0.0518 0.0950 0.1400 0.1856 0.2000 1.7070 0.1703
BAB.3m -0.0734 0.1250 0.1800 0.2806 0.3188 1.9470 0.2907
BAB.6m -0.1442 0.1315 0.2200 0.4018 0.3600 2.9120 0.5303
YIBc1 -0.2630 -0.0150 -0.0050 0.0112 0.0000 1.1210 0.1726
YIBc2 -0.4280 -0.0100 0.0000 0.0495 0.0298 1.9130 0.2985
YIBc3 -0.4248 -0.1072 0.0110 0.0919 0.0750 2.4130 0.4266
YIBc4 -0.4792 -0.1793 0.0150 0.1252 0.1010 3.1070 0.5654
YBAc1 -0.7596 0.1400 0.2000 0.2627 0.3300 1.6500 0.2639
YBAc2 -0.6475 0.1100 0.2023 0.3273 0.3700 3.2020 0.4981
YBAc3 -0.5277 -0.0200 0.1300 0.4496 0.4010 4.9020 0.9554
YBAc4 -0.6600 -0.1676 0.0600 0.5598 0.4539 5.6270 1.3364
YTTc1/1Y -0.8700 -0.4141 -0.1905 0.0414 0.2900 2.0480 0.6429
YTTc1/2Y -1.0370 -0.6442 -0.1970 0.1198 0.6436 2.7550 0.9623
YTTc1/3Y -1.3550 -0.7980 -0.2620 -0.0990 0.3687 1.8890 0.7996
YTCc1/1Y -1.1620 -0.5393 -0.1171 0.1668 0.8308 2.2300 0.8567
YTCc1/2Y -1.1670 -0.6466 -0.1478 0.1054 0.5642 2.4820 0.9183
YTCc1/3Y -1.2580 -0.6689 -0.1361 -0.1077 0.3297 1.4390 0.6717
cash rate averages were not being cut off beyond the end of our dataset in October 2010.
7Another way to consider longer term expectations is to examine pricing on longer term
(5th to 12th) bank bill futures contracts. However, these contracts tend to be illiquid, and
contain both term premia and credit premia along with futures-to-forward basis risk. We
believe that these risk premia are higher in magnitude than those applicable to Treasury
bond futures, so we stick with the latter contracts in our study.
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It is clear that the key limitation of the forecast errors discussed above
is that they contain risk premia. In other words, the fixed income market’s
pricing for these instruments does not purely reflect expectations – the market
yields also prices for various risks such as term risks, credit risks and liquidity
risks. A simple way to address this problem is to assume that market yields
price for risk down to a linear projection of the average cash rates – this is the
regression equation (4.1). The OLS estimates set out in Table 4.2 demonstrate
that it is indeed possible to abstract away from some of the risk premia for
shorter dated securities. We are not suggesting here that risk premia are
constant through time, instead the idea is that they tend to average to a
constant at the short tenors, consistent with the asset pricing theory (set out
in the Appendix). The high R2 numbers for the shorter dated securities bear
testament to this, and imply that risk premia are being absorbed into the
regression intercept terms across instruments at shorter tenors.
More importantly, given the focus of our research on extracting expectations
from longer dated securities, the OLS estimates suggest that yields on the
longer dated three year and ten year bond futures contracts explain substantial
amounts of the variability in the cash rate. For instance, the R2 for the three
year bond futures contract over a one year horizon is 64.6% and that for ten year
contract over a three year horizon is 64.4%. Hence, the pricing in bond futures
contracts does seem to incorporate a signal on expectations, albeit a weaker
one than the short end securities. Nonetheless, the appropriate inference is
not to reject long dated securities as market measures of expectations, but
to recognise that risk premia are distorting those signals in a manner that
cannot be corrected by linear models alone.
However, there may be lot more information on expectations priced into
longer dated securities than is reflected in the OLS results. If this is the
case, the challenge is therefore to model the additional risk premia that would
otherwise be part of the OLS error term (forecast errors). This may improve
the overall fit of the regression, and therefore facilitate identification of the
underlying signal on expectations in implied yields on bond futures contracts.
As explained above, our preferred mechanism for achieving this is instrumental
variables. This is because the risk premia can be treated as measurement errors,
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Table 4.2: OLS estimates for equation (4.1)
Series α se(α) β se(β) R2
OIS.1m 0.0565 0.0154 0.9825 0.0027 0.9892
OIS.3m 0.4290 0.0245 0.9106 0.0043 0.9690
OIS.6m 0.8446 0.0394 0.8293 0.0069 0.9100
BAB.1m 0.0639 0.0216 0.9567 0.0037 0.9789
BAB.3m 0.2226 0.0334 0.9145 0.0056 0.9478
BAB.6m 0.6826 0.0549 0.8204 0.0092 0.8469
YIBc1 -0.0952 0.0250 1.0124 0.0044 0.9733
YIBc2 0.1339 0.0371 0.9681 0.0066 0.9378
YIBc3 0.5570 0.0472 0.8915 0.0083 0.8879
YIBc4 0.8866 0.0584 0.8307 0.0103 0.8176
YBAc1 0.4832 0.0279 0.8751 0.0047 0.9595
YBAc2 0.7562 0.0499 0.8193 0.0084 0.8672
YBAc3 1.3313 0.1014 0.7040 0.0170 0.5413
YBAc4 2.5937 0.1456 0.4769 0.0244 0.2094
YTTc1/1Y -0.1416 0.1079 1.0184 0.0196 0.6461
YTTc1/2Y 6.1874 0.2152 -0.1034 0.0375 0.0062
YTTc1/3Y 10.2088 0.0981 -0.7953 0.0174 0.6814
YTCc1/1Y -2.0842 0.2406 1.3442 0.0430 0.3973
YTCc1/2Y 8.9949 0.3125 -0.5960 0.0547 0.0880
YTCc1/3Y 11.9909 0.1491 -1.1135 0.0265 0.6435
and using an instrumental variables framework, we can specify combinations
of regressors and instruments that allow us to strip out the effects of various
types of risk premia.
Of course, the validity of this approach depends on the quality of our
instruments. We have selected rates on the one, three and six month OIS
securities and the implied yields on second, third and fourth interbank futures
contracts as instruments in our analysis. We use the implied yields on the
three and ten year Treasury bond futures contracts as regressors.8 In all cases,
8We performed F -tests on each of the pairs of instruments and regressors in order to
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we use the average cash rate over horizons of one, two and three years as the
dependent variables in our instrumental variables framework.
Results for the GMM IV estimation of model (4.2) with moment conditions
(4.3) for the various combinations of regressors and instruments are set out
in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Starting with the coefficients and root mean squared
forecast errors (RMSE) set out in Table 4.3, it is clear that the GMM IV model
performs almost equally as well as the OLS model in forecasting the average
cash rate with implied yields on three and ten year bond futures contracts
instrumented by pricing on OIS and interbank futures. This is to be expected,
given that the objective function for the OLS regressions is directly defined in
terms of minimising the RMSE. Interestingly, with the exception of the two
year forecast horizon for three year bond futures, the forecast accuracy for
both the three year and ten year futures increases as we push out the forecast
horizon further. As suggested above, this result could be driven by the flight
to quality during the Global Financial Crisis. But it is also arguable that
medium term policy expectations were being adjusted during this period, and
that this adjustment was reflected in the implied yields on three year and ten
year bond futures over the three year horizon.
Table 4.3 also indicates that the GMM IV coefficient estimates are often
quite different from the corresponding OLS coefficient estimates, and the
standard errors of the coefficients are always much higher in the GMM IV
case. This does not necessarily translate into a clearer interpretation of the
coefficients, though. If we had managed to control for all risk premia in the
bond futures pricing with our GMM IV framework, and the fixed income
market’s ex-ante expectations for the cash rate are unbiased, then we should
see the slope coefficients converge towards one, and the intercept coefficients
fall away to zero. In the result, the direction and magnitude of the coefficient
changes from the GMM IV model relative to the OLS model are far from
clear. For example, it is encouraging that the GMM IV intercept (slope)
coefficients for the three year futures over the three year horizon for all six
test for the presence of weak instruments. In results not reproduced here, our tests rejected
at the 1% level the hypotheses that the slope coefficients were zero for all of the pairs
under considerations. This constitutes evidence that our selected instruments are not weak
instruments in the context of our model.
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instruments are slightly closer to zero (one) than their OLS equivalents. But
this result is reversed for the ten year futures contract with the six instrument
combinations.
Nonetheless, despite their similar forecasting performance, it is arguable
that the GMM IV models provide a better description of the underlying data.
This is because OLS model can only control for risk premia via the intercept
term, whereas the GMM IV model adjusts for risk premia with both the
intercept term and the use of yields on short term securities as instruments.
In ther words, while the RMSE may be slightly lower for the OLS model than
for the GMM IV model across the sample, the GMM IV forecasts could be
expected to be superior at any particular point in time within the sample due
to the greater capacity of this model to control for risk premia.
Table 4.4 presents results on the forecast accuracy results of the GMM
IV models, in order to present a deeper analysis of its performance as a
market based measure of policy expectations. In this Table, it is clear that the
models are all unbiased, regardless of the regressor, instrument and horizon.
The mean absolute errors (MAE), mean percentage errors (MPE) and mean
absolute percentage errors (MAPE) are all consistent with the RMSE results
for each model presented already, and reproduced in this Table. Finally, the
test statistic and p-value for the two-sided Diebold and Mariano (2002) test for
forecast equivalency are set out in the last two columns of the Table. In almost
all cases,9 the test rejects the null hypothesis of forecast equivalency between
the forecast errors of the GMM IV and OLS models. This shows that our
empirical framework complements the existing OLS models commonly used in
the literature by such authors as Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007) and Goodhart and
Lim (2011).
In circumstances like these, where there is a degree of uncertainty about
model specification, it is appropriate to take averages across the results of the
different GMM IV model specifications that we have applied to our dataset.
Specifically, the simple average of the GMM IV RMSE results in Tables 4.3 and
4.4 across the OIS and interbank futures instruments over the one to three year
9Except for the problematic two year horizon, which is affected by the end of the dataset
for that horizon in October 2008, at the height of the Global Financial Crisis.
66
horizon is 55 basis points for the three year futures contract, and is 63 basis
points for the ten year futures contract. These RMSE numbers indicate that
there is a fair degree of accuracy in the policy expectations embedded in bond
futures pricing during our sample period. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed
to find a professional forecaster (or to construct an econometric model without
reference to financial market pricing) able to forecast the average cash rate
over a one to three year horizon to this degree of accuracy.
Hence, the IV model helps uncover the signal on expectations in market
pricing for the longer dated fixed income securities, and does constitute a
substantial improvement on the OLS models, in a way that is driven by
economic arguments. In this respect our work constitutes a natural extension
of Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007) and Goodhart and Lim (2011), by translating
their OLS models for extracting expectations from fixed income securities into
an instrumental variables framework, thereby improving the extant models’
capacity to control for risk premia.
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Table 4.3: GMMIV estimates for moment conditions (4.3)
Regressor / Instrument / Horizon α se(α) β se(β) RMSEGMM (%) RMSEOLS (%)
YTTc1 / OIS.1m / 1Y -0.49 0.76 1.08 0.15 0.64 0.64
YTTc1 / OIS.3m / 1Y -0.54 0.62 1.09 0.12 0.65 0.64
YTTc1 / OIS.6m / 1Y -0.50 0.54 1.08 0.11 0.65 0.64
YTTc1 / YIBc2 / 1Y -0.50 0.66 1.08 0.13 0.64 0.64
YTTc1 / YIBc3 / 1Y -0.55 0.58 1.09 0.12 0.65 0.64
YTTc1 / YIBc4 / 1Y -0.58 0.54 1.10 0.11 0.65 0.64
YTTc1 / OIS.1m / 2Y 9.22 1.42 -0.63 0.26 0.79 0.74
YTTc1 / OIS.3m / 2Y 7.92 0.65 -0.41 0.12 0.76 0.74
YTTc1 / OIS.6m / 2Y 7.50 0.26 -0.33 0.05 0.75 0.74
YTTc1 / YIBc2 / 2Y 8.47 0.94 -0.50 0.17 0.77 0.74
YTTc1 / YIBc3 / 2Y 7.62 0.57 -0.35 0.11 0.75 0.74
YTTc1 / YIBc4 / 2Y 7.13 0.14 -0.27 0.03 0.74 0.74
YTTc1 / OIS.1m / 3Y 9.91 1.13 -0.74 0.19 0.23 0.23
YTTc1 / OIS.3m / 3Y 9.83 1.06 -0.73 0.18 0.23 0.23
YTTc1 / OIS.6m / 3Y 9.91 1.05 -0.74 0.18 0.23 0.23
YTTc1 / YIBc2 / 3Y 9.93 1.11 -0.75 0.19 0.23 0.23
YTTc1 / YIBc3 / 3Y 9.83 1.07 -0.73 0.18 0.23 0.23
YTTc1 / YIBc4 / 3Y 9.87 1.06 -0.74 0.18 0.23 0.23
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Regressor / Instrument / Horizon α se(α) β se(β) RMSEGMM (%) RMSEOLS (%)
YTCc1 / OIS.1m / 1Y -6.43 4.28 2.12 0.78 0.93 0.84
YTCc1 / OIS.3m / 1Y -6.37 3.57 2.11 0.66 0.92 0.84
YTCc1 / OIS.6m / 1Y -6.18 3.05 2.08 0.57 0.92 0.84
YTCc1 / YIBc2 / 1Y -6.38 3.80 2.12 0.70 0.93 0.84
YTCc1 / YIBc3 / 1Y -6.33 3.33 2.11 0.62 0.92 0.84
YTCc1 / YIBc4 / 1Y -6.35 3.07 2.11 0.57 0.92 0.84
YTCc1 / OIS.1m / 2Y 11.50 0.89 -1.04 0.16 0.72 0.71
YTCc1 / OIS.3m / 2Y 9.49 0.14 -0.68 0.03 0.71 0.71
YTCc1 / OIS.6m / 2Y 8.81 0.02 -0.56 0.00 0.71 0.71
YTCc1 / YIBc2 / 2Y 10.36 0.14 -0.84 0.02 0.71 0.71
YTCc1 / YIBc3 / 2Y 9.01 0.51 -0.60 0.10 0.71 0.71
YTCc1 / YIBc4 / 2Y 8.23 0.04 -0.46 0.01 0.71 0.71
YTCc1 / OIS.1m / 3Y 14.19 1.20 -1.50 0.21 0.27 0.25
YTCc1 / OIS.3m / 3Y 13.86 1.23 -1.45 0.22 0.26 0.25
YTCc1 / OIS.6m / 3Y 13.72 1.16 -1.42 0.21 0.26 0.25
YTCc1 / YIBc2 / 3Y 14.09 1.18 -1.49 0.21 0.27 0.25
YTCc1 / YIBc3 / 3Y 13.78 1.21 -1.43 0.22 0.26 0.25
YTCc1 / YIBc4 / 3Y 13.79 1.19 -1.43 0.21 0.26 0.25
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Table 4.4: Forecast accuracy, GMMIV model (4.3)
Regressor / Instrument / Horizon Mean Error RMSE MAE MPE MAPE DM stat DM p-val
YTTc1 / OIS.1m / 1Y 0.00 0.64 0.50 -1.39 10.05 1.61 0.11
YTTc1 / OIS.3m / 1Y 0.00 0.65 0.50 -1.36 10.06 1.85 0.06
YTTc1 / OIS.6m / 1Y 0.00 0.65 0.50 -1.38 10.05 1.68 0.09
YTTc1 / YIBc2 / 1Y 0.00 0.64 0.50 -1.38 10.05 1.68 0.09
YTTc1 / YIBc3 / 1Y 0.00 0.65 0.50 -1.35 10.06 1.90 0.06
YTTc1 / YIBc4 / 1Y 0.00 0.65 0.50 -1.33 10.07 2.02 0.04
YTTc1 / OIS.1m / 2Y -0.00 0.79 0.58 -1.98 11.18 4.57 0.00
YTTc1 / OIS.3m / 2Y -0.00 0.76 0.56 -2.00 10.79 2.72 0.01
YTTc1 / OIS.6m / 2Y -0.00 0.75 0.56 -2.00 10.79 2.08 0.04
YTTc1 / YIBc2 / 2Y -0.00 0.77 0.56 -1.99 10.89 3.51 0.00
YTTc1 / YIBc3 / 2Y -0.00 0.75 0.56 -2.00 10.78 2.26 0.02
YTTc1 / YIBc4 / 2Y 0.00 0.74 0.56 -2.01 10.82 1.51 0.13
YTTc1 / OIS.1m / 3Y -0.00 0.23 0.20 -0.19 3.49 1.78 0.08
YTTc1 / OIS.3m / 3Y -0.00 0.23 0.20 -0.19 3.53 2.24 0.03
YTTc1 / OIS.6m / 3Y -0.00 0.23 0.20 -0.19 3.49 1.75 0.08
YTTc1 / YIBc2 / 3Y -0.00 0.23 0.20 -0.19 3.49 1.66 0.10
YTTc1 / YIBc3 / 3Y -0.00 0.23 0.20 -0.19 3.52 2.19 0.03
YTTc1 / YIBc4 / 3Y -0.00 0.23 0.20 -0.19 3.51 1.97 0.05
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Regressor / Instrument / Horizon Mean Error RMSE MAE MPE MAPE DM stat DM p-val
YTCc1 / OIS.1m / 1Y 0.00 0.93 0.75 -1.63 15.44 8.68 0.00
YTCc1 / OIS.3m / 1Y 0.00 0.92 0.75 -1.64 15.40 8.58 0.00
YTCc1 / OIS.6m / 1Y 0.00 0.92 0.75 -1.70 15.28 8.26 0.00
YTCc1 / YIBc2 / 1Y 0.00 0.93 0.75 -1.64 15.41 8.60 0.00
YTCc1 / YIBc3 / 1Y 0.00 0.92 0.75 -1.65 15.37 8.51 0.00
YTCc1 / YIBc4 / 1Y 0.00 0.92 0.75 -1.65 15.39 8.54 0.00
YTCc1 / OIS.1m / 2Y -0.00 0.72 0.53 -1.74 10.11 3.64 0.00
YTCc1 / OIS.3m / 2Y 0.00 0.71 0.52 -1.84 10.00 0.72 0.47
YTCc1 / OIS.6m / 2Y 0.00 0.71 0.52 -1.87 10.04 0.26 0.79
YTCc1 / YIBc2 / 2Y -0.00 0.71 0.52 -1.80 10.02 1.98 0.05
YTCc1 / YIBc3 / 2Y 0.00 0.71 0.52 -1.86 10.02 0.01 0.99
YTCc1 / YIBc4 / 2Y 0.00 0.71 0.52 -1.90 10.14 1.10 0.27
YTCc1 / OIS.1m / 3Y 0.00 0.27 0.22 -0.07 3.91 8.29 0.00
YTCc1 / OIS.3m / 3Y -0.00 0.26 0.22 -0.09 3.80 7.13 0.00
YTCc1 / OIS.6m / 3Y 0.00 0.26 0.22 -0.09 3.76 6.61 0.00
YTCc1 / YIBc2 / 3Y -0.00 0.27 0.22 -0.07 3.87 7.95 0.00
YTCc1 / YIBc3 / 3Y -0.00 0.26 0.22 -0.09 3.78 6.84 0.00
YTCc1 / YIBc4 / 3Y 0.00 0.26 0.22 -0.09 3.78 6.88 0.00
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4.5 Conclusion
In summary, our results in respect of expectations in short dated securities
were consistent with the literature. The short end securities contain different,
complementary information on monetary policy expectations over horizons of
up to two quarters ahead. Furthermore, in our OLS analysis, we confirmed
that longer dated securities are subject to risk premia, which complicates the
estimation of longer horizon measures of policy expectations from these securi-
ties. To address this problem, we constructed measures of policy expectations
in Australian Treasury three year and ten year bond futures pricing over the
one to three year horizon with our GMM IV framework. We found that the
bond futures pricing contains policy expectations that are accurate to well
inside 75 basis points (or three standard movements in the cash rate of 25
basis points) when forecasting the average of future movements in the cash
rate over horizons of one to three years.
Hence, we have demonstrated with our simple empirical framework that
pricing on three year and ten year bond futures contracts incorporates impor-
tant information about monetary policy expectations at horizons of between
one and three years — information that could be highly beneficial for policy
makers and investors.
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Appendix
The fundamental theorem of asset pricing states that in equilibrium, the conditional
expectation of the gross return on an asset (1 + rt,t+k) multiplied by the stochastic
discount factor Mt,t+k is the unit of account (Duffie, 2001), so that
Et[(1 + rt,t+k)Mt,t+k] = 1. (4.4)
It follows from the definition of covariance that
Et[1 + rt,t+k] =
1− Covt[1 + rt,t+k,Mt,t+k]
Et[Mt,t+k]
. (4.5)
Consider the k period return on security s, r
(s)
t,t+k and the return from a k period
rolling return on a series of investments in the overnight interbank lending rate
(monetary policy instrument), denoted by
it,t+k ≡
t+k−1∏
j=t
(1 + ij)− 1,
where it is the overnight interbank lending rate at time t. Writing out equation
(4.5) for the two assets and differencing results in
Et[1 + r
(s)
t,t+k] = Et[1 + it,t+k] + ρ
(s)
t,t+k, (4.6)
where the risk premium on security s relative to the overnight interbank lending
rate is defined as
ρ
(s)
t,t+k ≡
Covt[it,t+k,Mt,t+k]− Covt[1 + rt,t+k,Mt,t+k]
Et[Mt,t+k]
.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Throughout this dissertation, we have argued that bond market pricing reveals
important economic and financial information. Thus, we explored credit and
liquidity premia in Chapter 2, and showed how they could be derived in a
consistent manner from traded bond yields using the zero coupon surface.
Our empirical analysis illustrated the evolution of credit and liquidity premia
in the Australian semi-government, supranational and agency bond market
through the Global Financial Crisis. Chapter 3 demonstrated that there
is a distinct relation between the conditional shape of term premia across
tenors and factors summarising the forward curve and the macroeconomy. Our
application of the inequality constraints tests to U.S. Treasury bill returns in
conjunction with the excess return forecasting factors suggested that market
pricing for term risk in the short end of the Treasury yield curve is best
analysed jointly with the excess return forecasting factors that characterise
the state of the economy and the forward curve. Finally, in Chapter 4 we
found that there is different, but complementary information about market
expectations of future monetary policy movements in Australian fixed income
securities. Moreover, our instrumental variables framework showed that
reasonably accurate forecasts of monetary policy beyond the next two quarters
can be derived from longer term securities.
Taking a step back, the discriminating reader may notice a certain empirical
philosophy behind our work. Specifically, in each Chapter, we have tried to
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be as agnostic as possible about the bond market pricing data. Our aim
has always been to let bond market pricing speak for itself, as it were. The
modelling frameworks that we have developed and advocated throughout this
dissertation impose minimal structure on the underlying bond yield data, and
do not interfere with market pricing in examining the various components of
bond yields.
The reason for this stance is not a na¨ıve belief in market efficiency. Instead
it is a sense of conservatism on the part of the econometrician in seeking to
interpret the markets. Each trade in the fixed income market absorbs and
reflects a plethora of economic and financial information. Most of the time,
extensive analysis is performed and intricate judgment is exercised before trades
are executed. Clearly, the decision making processes of market participants
are complex – far more complex than could ever be incorporated fully into a
model. Nonetheless, we believe firmly that our approaches constitute the next
best alternatives to individual case studies of the actual trading, investment,
hedging and issuance strategies employed by market participants that converge
in the bond market to drive pricing. We find this empirical stance to be far
more insightful and persuasive than imposing unnecessary structure on the
bond market pricing data with elaborate models.
Hence we envisage that, beyond extending the extant scholarly literature on
fixed income markets and empirical finance, our research will be highly useful in
practice. Portfolio managers and dealers could use the zero coupon surface as a
powerful relative value tool to inform their trades in non-benchmark segments
of the bond market, such as financial and corporate bonds. Sovereign debt
managers and corporate treasurers could apply the conditional monotonicity
tests to term premia in their funding markets of choice and translate the
results into issuance strategies that minimise ongoing accrual debt servicing
costs subject to acceptable levels of refinancing risks. Central banks could
assess the efficacy of the crucial monetary policy transmission mechanism into
the bond market with the instrumental variables framework; and also use it
to gauge market expectations for future policy movements.
It is clear that our work provides a starting point for a more comprehensive
empirical examination of bond yields. Many extensions spring to mind as
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we reflect on our methodologies and findings. The zero coupon surface could
be fit across the entire bond market (not just Australian dollar denominated
semi-government, supranational and agency bonds), and updated in real-time
with live market pricing rather on a quarterly basis. This would lead to a
much more complete picture of market pricing as it evolves. The conditional
tests of the liquidity preference hypothesis could be applied to returns on
longer term Treasury zero coupon bonds. Of course, this has the drawback
of conflating expectations with term premia, but it would be of far more
relevance to bond issuers to gauge the conditional shape of term premia
across tenors of one to ten years rather than simply up to one year. The
best comparators for the instrumental variable measures of monetary policy
expectations from fixed income securities are actually surveys of forecasts by
market economists. Endogeneity issues aside, it would be very interesting
to evaluate these forecasts against our measures (but unfortunately there
currently is a lack of historical data on Australian economists’ medium term
monetary policy forecasts).
Following on from these leads, much work still needs to be done to extend
the research undertaken in this dissertation. But our empirical frameworks
are highly extensible, as they were designed to be easily adaptable to changing
market conditions and new fixed income technologies and structures. Indeed,
our research is testament to the forward-looking dynamics which manifest the
functional essence (and æsthetic quality) of the bond market: fixed income
pricing, expectations and risk premia are perpetually re-evaluated and updated
by market participants as they absorb the continuous flow of economic and
financial market information.
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